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THE SPOT PROGRAM: HELLO RACIAL PROFILING,
GOODBYE FOURTH AMENDMENT?
BY DEBORAH L. MEYER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Without a doubt, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001
("9/11") left the United States reeling from the incredible destruction
and loss of life' caused by what was thought to be a generally safe and
commonplace mode of transportation: the airplane. 2 Certainly, the
planes themselves did not cause the attacks; however, they became the
perfect "bombs" for those who did.3 Now, the world is more afraid of
the potential for terrorist attacks using aircrafts as explosive devices.
As evidence of this fear, airlines suffered tremendous economic losses
after 9/11 as the flying public considered alternative forms of
Copyright 0 2011 by Deborah L. Meyer.
* Product Manager, LexisNexis, North American Legal Markets.
1. In total, 2,973 people died on 9/11. The New York Fire Department (FDNY) lost
343 emergency personnel, "[t]he largest loss of life of any emergency response agency in
history." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9-11
COMMISSION REPORT 311 (henceforth known as the 9/11 REPORT). The Port Authority Police
Department (PAPD) suffered "37 fatalities - the largest loss of life of any police force in
history." Id. The New York Police Department (NYPD) suffered "23 fatalities-the second
largest loss of life of any police force in history, exceeded only by the number of PAPD
officers lost the same day." Id.
2. The 9/11 Timeline:
8:46:40 A.M. - American Airlines Flight II flew into the upper portion of the North World
Trade Center (WTC) Tower, cutting through floors 93-99.
9:03:11 A.M. - United Airlines Flight 175 hit the South WTC Tower, crashing through the
77th to 85th floors.
9:37 A.M. - American Airlines Flight 77 hit the west wall of the Pentagon.
9:58:59 A.M. - the South Tower collapses, killing everyone remaining inside as well as
individuals on the concourse, in the Marriott hotel, and on the street.
10:28:25 A.M. - the North Tower collapses, killing everyone on upper floors and numerous
individuals on the floors below.
9/11 REPORT 285, 293, 305, 311. For a more detailed account of the events of 9/11, see
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, UPDATE TO FAA HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY: CIVIL
AVIATION AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1926-1996 p. 53-54
http://www.faa.gov/about/media/FAAChronology_1997-2008.pdf.
3. American Airlines Flight II was a Boeing 767-200ER with a maximum fuel
capacity of approximately 23,980 U.S. gal. United Airlines Flight 175 was a Boeing 767-200
with a maximum fuel capacity of approximately 16,700 U.S. gal. BOEING, 767 FAMILY
TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/767family/specs.html (last
visited Nov. 30, 2009).
290 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 10:2
transportation.4 While not all of those financial losses can be blamed
on the attacks of 9/11, certainly the devastation caused that day played
a significant role in the decrease in air travel and airline profit. During
the nine years since 9/11, the conveniences of flight have slowly
gained ground against any remaining fears of flying.5 Yet, the threat of
new attacks still remains a real and credible danger.6
The government quickly enacted new laws and regulations
regarding airport security to guard against any possibility of another
9/11 attack. Most airline passengers are now very familiar with the
onslaught of security obstacles awaiting them at domestic airports.
They plan accordingly for the additional security checkpoint time,
leaving home hours before a flight knowing the long lines that will
certainly be waiting for them. 7 They walk through the visible
4. During the eight years prior to 9/11 (1993-2000), the six largest legacy carriers -
American, Delta, Northwest, United, Continental, and USAir - had cumulative net profits of
$17.1 billion. "The same airlines had a cumulative net loss of $38.5 billion in the following
eight years (2001-2008)." In addition, over 155,000 jobs have been lost from these six
carriers alone since 9/11. Robert Herbst, How the Legacy Airlines Lost So Much Altitude Since
9/11, 24/7 WallSt,, Aug. 31, 2009, http://247wallst.com/2009/08/31/45418/.
5. In July 2005, airlines saw both passenger travel and airline capacity numbers
(measured in the number of available seats) overtake pre-9/11 peak numbers. The number of
available seats increased 0.6 percent over August 2001 numbers while passengers traveling
increased 9.7 percent from the same time period. Research and Innovative Technology
Administration Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Airline Travel Since 9/11,
http://www.bts.gov/publications/special-reports and issuebriefs/issuebriefs/number_13/ht
ml/entire.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2010).
6. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate a bomb made from PETN during
the final descent of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit on December
25, 2009. Devlin Barrett and Eileen Sullivan, Alleged Christmas Day Terrorist is Charged,
The Associated Press, December 26, 2009. "PETN is a powerful explosive (50 percent more
powerful than TNT, 90 percent of the power of RDX) which is used in detonating cords and
plasticized explosive sheets. It has been manufactured and used for commercial and military
purposes in many countries since the 1940s." GIS Staff, More Details of "Shoe Bomb"
Technology Becoming Available," Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, (Jan. 14, 2002).
Abdulmutallab was indicted on six counts including attempted murder in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on Jan. 13, 2010. See also generally United
States General Accounting Office Report, Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched,
Developed, and Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but
Continue to Face Challenges, GAO-10-128, Oct. 7, 2009 (outlining three broad trends in the
types of threats now faced by airport security: "interest in catastrophic destruction of aircraft";
the expanded range of weapons, many of which cannot be detected by current technologies;
and the vulnerability of "soft" airports targets such as lobbies).
7. The TSA recommends that domestic passengers arrive at the airport least two hours
prior to their flight. International passengers should allot additional time. Transportation
Security Administration, Our Travel Assistant,
http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/assistant/arrival.shtm (last visited Aug. 21, 2010).
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magnetometers8 after putting carry-on baggage on conveyor belts to be
X-rayed. They take off their shoes, remove their coats, and place every
known piece of metal on their person in a round plastic container to
prevent the dreaded beeping of the alarm and the follow-up inspection
that then ensues.9
But most airline passengers may not know of a relatively new
"unseen" program airport security is using to ferret out would-be
terrorists before they even make it to the security checkpoint. This
unpublicized program is the Screening of Passengers by Observation
Technique, otherwise known as "SPOT."'0 The Transportation
Security Administration ("TSA") I now uses SPOT as one of its
newest security innovations to hopefully recognize potential terrorists
through "behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify
high-risk passengers."' 2 To implement this program, the TSA specially
trained several of its agents, called Behavior Detection Officers
("BDOs"),13 to observe travelers for "involuntary physical and
8. "The basic magnetometer consists of a sensor that produces a signal that is
proportional to the strength of the magnetic field around it." Moreland, Carl, Search for
Ferrous Objects with a Fluxgate Magnetometer, POPTRONICS, (May 1, 2001).
9. See Transportation Security Administration, Layers of Security,
http://www.tsa.gov/what-wedo/layers/index.shtm (last visited Aug. 21, 2010).
10. The SPOT program is a "behavior observation and analysis program designed to
provide the TSA Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) with a means of identifying persons
who pose or may pose potential transportation security risks." See Department of Homeland
Security, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE SCREENING OF PASSENGERS BY OBSERVATION
TECHNIQUES (SPOT) PROGRAM, (Aug. 5, 2008). SPOT is one such technique used by the TSA
under the authority granted to it by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), sec.
114(f), (Pub. L. 107-71, Nove. 19, 2001). Id The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
published its approval of this Privacy Impact Assessment concerning its new program in the
Federal Register, 73 FR 72812 (Dec. 1, 2008).
11. The TSA was established as part of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA), Pub. Law 107-71, 115 STAT. 597, 49 USCS §114 passed on Nov. 19, 2001. Airline
passenger security screening was delegated to the TSA under 49 USCS §44901. On their
home website, the TSA lists its mission as "protect[ing] the Nation's transportation systems to
ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce." Transportation Security
Administration, Mission, Vision, and Core Values, www.tsa.gov/public/display?theme=7) (last
visited Jan. 14, 2010).
12. Transportation Security Administration, Where We Stand: TSA Trains Hard for New
Threats, http://www.tsa.gov/press/wherewe_stand/training.shtm (last visited January 1,
2010).
13. Transportation Security Administration, Behavior Detection Officers (BDO): Layers
of Security, http://www.tsa.gov/what we do/layers/bdo/index.shtm (last visited Jan. 3, 2010)
(the BDOs are "designed to detect individuals exhibiting behaviors that indicate they may be a
threat to aviation and/or transportation security"). To become a BDO, a TSA screener must
only complete four days of classroom training and 24 hours of supervised on-the-job work.
Transportation Security Administration, BDOs SPOT More Than Just Opportunities at TSA,
May 8, 2007 (http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/boston bdo-spot.shtm). Currently, more
than 3,000 BDOs patrol 161 airports nationwide. Liliana Segura, Feeling Nervous? 3,000
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physiological reactions that people exhibit in response to a fear of
being discovered."' 4 BDOs watch for these types of reactions by
simply observing a person of interest or by actually engaging that
person in what appears to be harmless dialogue. If warranted, BDOs
may "refer these individuals for additional screening at the passenger
security checkpoint."' 5
While most people acknowledge the importance of successful
airport security programs to ensure airline passenger safety, Americans
should not blindly throw political and/or financial support behind
every program pioneered by the TSA.16 Considering the money now
being used to further the program, SPOT supporters must be able to
overcome two very fundamental obstacles. First, most scientific
Behavior Detection Officers Will Be Watching You at the Airport This Thanksgiving, AlterNet,
Nov. 24, 2009
(http://www.alternet.org/rights/144101/feeling nervous_3,000_behavior detection officers w
ill be watchingyou at the airport this thanksgiving).
14. Transportation Security Administration, Behavior Detection Officers (BDO): Layers
of Security, supra note 13. But see JAMES MOORE, 27-641 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE -
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §641.131 (Matthew Bender, 3d ed. 2009) (arguing that an insufficient
basis exists for arresting someone based on inherently "unsuspicious characteristics common
to many innocent travelers, such as nervous behavior,... walking quickly through the terminal,
and clutching one's luggage") (emphasis added).
15. Transportation Security Administration, Behavior Detection Officers (BDO): Layers
of Security, supra note 13. In 2008, BDOs nationwide subjected 98,805 passengers to
secondary screenings. Ken Kaye, TSA Screening More Than Just Carry-On Bags; 'Behavior
Detection' Officers Covertly Watch Travelers' Conduct, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2009 at Al 5.
Secondary screenings involve additional security measures beyond walking through a metal
detector and subjecting carry-on bags to X-ray machines. These additional security measures
may include "hand-wand, physical pat-down, an ETP [explosive trace portals], which is used
to detect traces of explosives on passengers buy using puffs or air to dislodge particles from
their body and clothing into an analyzer." UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
REPORT, GAO-10-128 supra note 6.
16. To achieve its mandate to protect the flying public of the United States and
international visitors, the TSA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have invested
over $795 million for the "research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), procurement,
and deployment of checkpoint screening technologies." UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, GAO-10-128 supra note 6. The result of this substantial
investment is a multilayered system of security consisting of three pivotal parts: the screeners
themselves, the procedures they follow, and the technology they use during the screening
process. Id. The TSA works with the Science and Technology Directorate ("S&T") within the
DHS to development new technologies. S&T provides the research while the TSA, through
their Passenger Screening Program ("PSP") identifies the need and then implements the
output. Id. at 2. Of the $6 billion budget in the President's fiscal year 2009 for aviation
security, $4.5 billion was earmarked for "I) screening operations, including transportation
security officer (TSO) and private screener allocation, and checkpoint screening technologies;
2) air cargo; and 3) and passenger watch-list matching." UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, AVIATION SECURITY TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION HAS STRENGTHENED PLANNING TO GUIDE INVESTMENTS IN KEY AVIATION
SECURITY PROGRAMS, BUT MORE WORK REMAINS, GAO-08-456T, Feb. 28, 2008.
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studies suggest that human beings are not capable of making such
quick subjective judgments.17 However, success with this type of
security has been seen in other countries, most notably Israel. Israel
has not had a hijacking in over forty years' 8 using this passenger
screening technique.
Second, stopping and searching an individual based on the
behavioral observations may be a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment protects all citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures, granting them the right "to be secure in their
persons. . .against unreasonable searches and seizures" and to have
warrants issued only "upon probable cause."' 9 In order for any search
or seizure prompted by a BDO's observations to be constitutionally
sound, the BDO must have had probable cause of criminal activity or
must demonstrate that the search or seizure fell within an exception to
the probable cause requirement. Two well-developed and well-known
exceptions to the probable cause requirement apply in the majority of
17. See COMMITrEE OF LAW AND JUSTICE, ET. AL., PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN
THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAM ASSESSMENT at 251
(National Academies Press, 2008) ("...even if deception or the presence of an emotion can be
accurately and reliably detected, information about the reason for deception, a given emotion,
or a given behavior is not available from the measurements taken. A person exhibiting
nervousness may be excited about meeting someone at the airport or about being late. A
person lying about his or her travel plans may be concealing an extramarital affair. A person
fidgeting may be experiencing back pain. None of those persons would be the targets of
counterterrorist efforts, nor should they be-and the possibility that their true motivations and
intents may be revealed has definite privacy implications."). See also Thomas Frank, TSA 's
'Behavior Detection' Leads to Few Arrests, USA TODAY, Nov. 19, 2008 available at
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2008-1/-17-behavior-detection N.htm, (quoting
Robert Levinson, a psychologist at the University of California-Berkeley, "[t]he use of these
technologies for the purpose that the TSA is interested in moves into an area where we don't
have proven science.").
18. See Jonathan B. Tucker, Strategies for Countering Terrorism: Lessons from the
Israeli Experience, JOURNAL OF HOMELAND SECURITY (March 2003) ("El Al's [the Israeli
national airline] passenger screening system, established in the early 1970s, relies on
psychological profiling techniques backed up with high-technology equipment. This system
has been highly effective: the last successful hijacking of an El Al jet was in 1968..."); See
also Don Lemon, et.al, Tighter International Air Security; U.S. Closes Embassy in Yemen;
NBA, Guns & Band Judgment; Full Body Scans in Britain; Lockdown at Newark Airport,
CNN: CNN NEWSROOM, (Jan. 3, 2010) (quoting Paula Hancocks, CNN Correspondent
reporting from Ben Gurion Airport "...no airplane that has left [tlhis airport has ever been
hijacked. And Israel's national carrier, El Al, is probably one of the safest if not the safest in
the world."), and Fredricka Whitfield, et. al., Failed Bombing Suspect Indicted; Iran's Nuclear
Ambitions, CNN: THE SITUATION RooM, (Jan. 6, 2010) (quoting Michael Oren, Israel
Ambassador to the United States "...Israel does present a different model for airport and
airline security. Israel is less concerned with what people are wearing or the way they're
dressed and what they're carrying. Rather, we're more concerned with the way they behave."
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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airport security search and seizure situations: Terry v. Ohio S20 "stop
and frisk" and the administrative search exception.2
In Part II, this article will discuss the Fourth Amendment,
specifically, the two main exceptions to its prohibition against
unwarranted searches and seizures: Terry's "stop and frisk" and
administrative searches. Part III will then review a brief history of
profiling in the United States, most importantly its legality under the
Fourth Amendment. Part IV continues the discussion by asking if the
SPOT program has been successful under its current design in
stopping would-be terrorists. Part V will then apply the Fourth
Amendment to the SPOT program to test whether the program is
currently constitutionally sound and if it could remain so using limited
profiling as well as behavioral analysis. Finally, this article will
conclude with the proposition that the SPOT program, while not
popular, could be successful if tailored to include minimal profiling
techniques and does pass constitutional review if the ensuing security
searches are limited in scope according to TSA regulations.
1I. AIRPORT SEARCHES: AN UNUSUAL MARRIAGE OF "STOP AND FRISK"
AND ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES 22
A. A BrieffHistory of the Fourth Amendment
Royal authorities conducted unreasonable searches at will
during the colonial period while the colonies were still under British
20. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Supreme Court's decision in Terry developed
the now well-established search and seizure exception known as "stop and frisk." See infra
Part II.B.
21. Administrative search warrants "may be issued solely on a showing that 'reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an.. .inspection are satisfied with respect
to the particular' place to be searched-there need be no probable cause that a violation is
occurring in a particular place." 2-34 John Wesley Hall, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §34.1 (Matthew
Bender, 2009). An administrative search when applied to airport security mutates from its
original definition of a search necessitated to "passively advance the public health and
welfare" to a search necessitated by the overwhelming governmental interest in preventing
passengers from carrying weapons or explosives on board an airplane. 2-32 Hall, supra, at §
32.11. This governmental interest strives to ensure the safety of other passengers as well as
prevent the destruction of the airplane and the potential devastation such destruction can
cause. Since airport screening has now been taken over by the TSA, "flying on a commercial
airline is a 'highly regulated industry.' Thus, screening searches are now administrative
searches, and implied consent is no longer a valid consideration. 2-38 Hall, supra, at §38.28.
22. As the focuses of this paper are the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition to unwarranted searches and how they apply to the SPOT program, an extensive
analysis of the origins of the Amendment itself fall outside this paper's purview. For a detailed
explanation of the origins of the Fourth Amendment, see WILLIAM .. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING (Oxford 2009).
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rule.23 Indeed, hostilities over this unchecked search power spurred the
enthusiasm for independence. 24 When the Revolutionary War was
finally over, the writers of the newly formed United States
Constitution realized that the Government needed to be checked;
personal privacy needed to be preserved.2 s Thus, the Fourth
Amendment was drafted to protect against the arbitrary searches and
seizures so commonly executed before the war: "The notion that 'a
man's house [is] his castle' became 'a part of our constitutional law in
the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures."' 26
As the Founding Fathers envisioned, searches and seizures
must meet two conditions to fall under the Fourth Amendment
prohibitions: (1) the searches cannot occur when the person who is
searched has an expectation of privacy, (2) that expectation must be
reasonable.27 If these conditions are met, the authority conducting the
search must have a warrant. Yet, the Supreme Court has also ruled that
warrants are not required in every circumstance. Warrantless searches
that satisfy "some fundamental requirements embodied in the Warrant
23. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (Justice Bradley writing for the
Court noted that during colonial times, revenue officers could execute writs of assistance
which allowed them to search people's homes and possessions at their discretion; these writs
of assistance were "pronounced 'the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive
of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English
law book;' since they placed 'the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer"'
(citing COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 301-03 ( 5th ed. 368, 369))). The famous
debate in which these words were spoken was "perhaps the most prominent event which
inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother country." Id.
Quoting John Adams, Justice Bradley adds that 'Then and there,' said John Adams, 'then and
there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.
Then and there the child Independence was born."'). Id.
24. Id.
25. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 at 475 (1921) ("The Fourth Amendment
gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in the previous cases, its
protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority..."); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 at 393 (1914) ("The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great
principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land."). See generally Thomas K. Clancy, What
Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 307 (Summer, 1998). But see Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Framers' Search Power: The
Misunderstood Statutory History of Suspicion & Probable Cause, 50 B.C. L. REv. 363 at 365
(March, 2009) (the Fourth Amendment was not written to protect citizens from the
government, but the government from the citizens).
26. Clancy, supra note 25, at 310 (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390).
27. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 at 33 (2001) (explaining that "a Fourth
Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy
that society recognizes as reasonable" (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 at 361
(1967)).
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Clause also can be constitutional."28 Probable cause29 is one of those
important requirements. 30
Since the inception of the Fourth Amendment, however, the
Court has increasingly allowed several exceptions to cut into its strict
adherence to the constitutional mandate of probable cause. 3 1 Indeed,
the Court has decided that probable cause may be "irrelevant for
judging the reasonableness of many government searches and
seizures."32 Some governmental searches fall outside the need for a
warrant, "and when a warrant is not required (and the Warrant Clause
therefore not applicable), probable cause is not invariably required
either." 33 Thus, probable cause is no longer necessary to judge the
reasonableness of a search.34 The reasonableness of a search is now
"judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests of reasonable searches and seizures against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests." 35
B. The "Stop & Frisk" Exception
The Supreme Court solidified this movement away from
mandatory probable cause in Terry v. Ohio,36 the first Supreme Court
case to legalize a new exception to the probable cause requirement. In
Terry, a long-time beat cop, Officer McFadden, watched two men
walk back and forth in front a store window about twenty-four times.
28. Morgan Cloud, Searching through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1707 at 1722 (Fall, 1996).
29. The Supreme Court has defined probable cause as "a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)
(probable cause is "whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to
warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an
offense."); and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) ("Probable cause
exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed," (quoting
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925))).
30. Cloud, supra note 28, at 1722.
31. Id. at 1723 (discussing how the Supreme Court has started to read the clause
"disjunctively," meaning that a warrant is only an example of balancing a person's expectation
of privacy against the government's interest in conducting the search).
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)).
34. Id.
35. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn.,
489 U.S. 602, 619 (1985)).
36. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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The officer followed them where he saw them join a third man. The
officer approached them and asked their names. The men "mumbled
something" prompting McFadden to spin Terry around and pat down
his outside clothing where he found a pistol. He ordered them into a
store where he completed a pat down of the other suspects and
retrieved all the guns. The men were charged with carrying concealed
weapons; they moved to suppress.3 7
Now commonly known as "stop and frisk" (or a "Terry"
stop3), the exception in Terry arose out of the nebulous parameters
surrounding police encounters outside of a formal arrest.9 No real
guidelines existed to assist police on how far they could pursue an "on-
the-street" encounter4 when attempting to prevent a crime.41
However, this overwhelming interest in preventing a crime permitted,
in the eyes of the Court, a "limited" stop.42 In Terry, Chief Justice
Warren and seven other members of the Court, held that it is "not a
violation of the Fourth Amendment for an officer to detain and search
a man's person for a weapon in absence of a search warrant, so long as
the officer acts upon a reasonable belief based upon objective factors
that the man is armed and dangerous."43 "Reasonableness" is key:
"[s]omething in the activities of the person being observed or in his
surroundings must affirmatively suggest particular criminal activity,
completed, current, or intended."4 Over the years since the Terry
decision, "stop and frisk" encounters between police and potential
37. Id. at 4-7.
38. "Stop and frisk" is used by the Court in Terry, at 10. The Court first uses the phrase
"Terry stop" in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 253 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39. See Terry, 391 U.S. at 9 (setting forth the "difficult and troublesome issues
regarding a sensitive area of police activity-issues which have never before been squarely
presented to this Court"). The police activities in question are "on-the-street" encounters with
suspicious persons. Id. at 9-10.
40. Id.
41. Prior to Terry, this type of police work was seen as outside the Fourth Amendment if
no formal arrest was made. However, during the 1960's, many believed the police to be
overstepping their boundaries and using this preventative police power to harass minorities. I-
15 Hall, supra note 21, at §15.3.
42. See Terry, 391 U.S. at 27 (noting that a police officer has authority to search for
weapons even though he may not be certain that the individual is armed; the criteria is whether
a "reasonably prudent man" would believe his safety or the safety of others was in danger).
43. Peter Siggins, Racial Profiling in an Age of Terrorism, March 12, 2002
(http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/ethicalperspectives/profiling.html).
44. 1-15 Hall, supra note 21, at § 15. 2 .
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suspects have become a widely accepted exception to the prohibition
against warrantless searches. 45
The first pressure point with a stop and frisk is the legality of
the initial stop. If the stop is "bad" (illegal), so is everythin that
follows from it (a frisk or search, detention, or even an arrest). This
inquiry into whether the stop (and any subsequent search) was legal is
a two-pronged test: was the officer's action justifiable "at its
inception" and was it reasonably "related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place."4 7 Yet it should be
noted that not eve 7 dialogue between police and citizen constitutes a
stop (or seizure): 4  "[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."4 9 In other
words, a person has been "seized" only if a reasonable person in the
same circumstance would have believed "that he was not free to
leave."50 For example, in United States v. Mendenhall, the Court
pointed out that the respondent was not seized when the DEA agents
asked her for her airline ticket and identification. As long as the
respondent had no objective reason for thinking that she could not
leave, she had not been seized.5 If at any point a respondent feels that
she cannot simply walk away and leave, she has been seized for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 52 At that point when the
intercourse between officer and citizen becomes a stop, the officer
must be able to articulate the factors leading to a reasonable suspicion
45. But see the dissent in Terry. Justice Douglas in writing his dissent argues that
reasonable suspicion is unconstitutional. The only "reasonable" infringement of personal
liberty must be based in probable cause. Terry, 392 U.S. at 35-38.
46. Known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, so named in Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), this premise holds that evidence can be excluded if obtained via
prior illegal police activities unless the taint is purged by some intervening event." 1-7 Hall,
supra note 21, at§ 7.1.
47. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
48. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 (stating that "not all personal intercourse between
policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons."). See also Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White,
J., concurring, "[there] is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from
addressing questions to anyone on the streets.").
49. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
50. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Another "drug courier
profile" case, the Mendenhall case involves a woman who was stopped by DEA agents at the
Detroit Metropolitan Airport after exhibiting behaviors which they characterized as behaviors
indicative of persons carrying illegal narcotics. Mendenhall voluntarily answered their
questions before consenting to accompany them back to the DEA office. Id. at 547-550.
51. Id. at 555.
52. Cal. v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (stating that "An arrest [or seizure] requires
either physical force.. .or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority."). Id.
at 626.
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of criminal activity.53 In fact, the stopping officer must be able to
demonstrate he had a reasonable suspicion for the stop before the stop
occurred.54 However, since a stop is less intrusive than a frisk, the
constitutional requirements for a stop are less restrictive than for a
frisk:5sthe officer must merely demonstrate a governmental interest in
preventing a crime. An actual crime need not be committed.56
In the airport, TSA agents play the role of the police officer.
The agents are the enforcement authority of the airports, given the task
of preventing terrorists from boarding aircrafts.57 TSA BDOs look for
suspicious behavior, and when they spot such behavior, they exercise
the discretion of police officers who encounter such behavior on city
streets. They have the legal right to detain and question the suspicious
person as long as it stays within the confines of a Terry stop (or they
have probable cause for an arrest).
Thus, as with police stops on the street, TSA agent seizures or
stops of a person in an airport must fulfill a legitimate government
interest.59 To assess the general reasonableness of this stop, the
ensuing analysis must focus on the governmental interest to see if the
interest truly justifies the intrusion upon personal privacy; "there is 'no
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the
need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails.,,' 60 Without argument, preventing would-be terrorists
from blowing up an airplane is an overwhelming and exigent
governmental interest.61 Inconveniencing a person for a few minutes to
53. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. See generally United States v. Ledet, 2010 U.S. App.
Lexis 14388 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Smith, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 13813 (4th Cir.
2010); and Gentry v. Sevier, 597 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2010).
54. 1-15 Hall, supra note 21, at § 15.1.
55. 1-15 Hall, supra note 21, at § 15.2.
56. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10 (stating that "...the police should be allowed to "stop" a
person and detain him briefly for questioning upon suspicion that he may be connected with
criminal activity."). See also Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that
"Officer McFadden's right to interrupt Terry's freedom of movement and invade his privacy
arose only because circumstances warranted forcing an encounter with Terry in an effort to
prevent or investigate a crime").
57. See supra note 14.
58. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 (noting that "nothing we say today is to be taken as indicating
approval of police conduct outside the legitimate investigative sphere").
59. See supra note 56.
60. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37
(1967).
61. See The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, codified at 49
USC § 44925(a) (mandating that the Secretary of Homeland Security give a "high priority" to
airport screening checkpoint equipment). See also as examples Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d
89 at 106 (2007) (finding the "prevention of potential terrorists from entering the United
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ask them questions about their travel plans is certainly a justified
intrusion on personal privacy considering the overwhelming
governmental interest in domestic safety and the prevention of another
catastrophic air disaster. Clearly, the government's interest easily
outweighs the minor intrusions thrust upon passengers as they pass
through airport security.62 Under Terry, the reasonableness for these
stops (when balanced against the need for these stops) passes
constitutional scrutiny.63
However, individual stops must be justified as reasonable
given the circumstances leading to the stop. In other words, just
because BDOs can stop passengers in airports due to the government's
interest in stopping terrorists does not mean they can stop just
anybody.65 They still must articulate the objective factors which led
them to stop a particular individual. 66 "Inarticulate hunches" or
"simple good faith" are not enough to warrant a stop.67 In addition, the
stop must satisfy the two-pronged test:68 the stop must be reasonable at
its inception and as conducted. The totality of the circumstances
should be considered when evaluating the reasonableness of the "stop
factors." 69 A "series of acts" when taken together may be enough to
warrant the stop even though each of those acts is "innocent in
itself., 70 If this series of acts would lead a reasonably prudent person
to stop the offender, then the stop at its inception is good. 7 1 If the BDO
merely identifies himself or herself as a TSA agent72 and then
questions the suspect about his behavior, including asking his name
States" a compelling governmental interest) and Bolm v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.2d
1000 at 1027 (2002) ("[T]he government's interest in preventing terrorism is not only
important but paramount.").
62. See generally United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (2007).
63. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37
(1967).
64. See generally the discussion throughout Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 21-22.
67. Id. at 22.
68. Id. at 27-28.
69. "...the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Reasonableness, in
turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances." Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
7 1. Id.
72. See supra note 13 (all BDOs are specially trained TSA agents).
THE SPOT PROGRAM
and travel destination (without doing anything more intrusive), the
stop has also been conducted reasonably. 7
If the stop is legal, the court can then turn its attention to the
more intrusive frisk.74 As a frisk of an individual is much more
invasive than mere questioning, the factors prompting the frisk must
serve a greater interest.75 Accordingly, an officer may constitutionally
stop someone even though he has no constitutional grounds to frisk
him.76 No longer is the governmental interest in the prevention or
detection of crime enough; now the interest rises to the preservation of
the police officer who initiated the stop.77 If an officer reasonably
believes that the detainee is "armed and presently dangerous to the
officer or to others," the officer clearly may take the necessary steps
"to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to
neutralize the threat of physical harm."78 Since, however, the intrusion
upon the sanctity of personal privacy is so great, even with a brief pat
down, the circumstances which are articulated to justify the search
must meet the "exigencies" of preserving the safety of the officer and
those in the surrounding area.7 The officer does not have to "know"
that the detainee is armed; the standard is whether a "reasonably
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that
his safety or that of others was in danger."80 Since the stop and frisk
are two separate events under the Constitution, the officer must again
meet the two-pronged test for the frisk even if it has already been met
for the stop. If the officer can articulate factors to meet the "reasonably
prudent man" test, the search in its inception is good.82 When
conducting the search, the scope "must be 'strictly tied to and justified
73. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 (In Terry, Officer McFadden approached Terry and his
companion, identified himself as a police officer and asked them their names. The Court found
this reasonable in scope.).
74. See generally the premise in Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
75. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
76. 1-15 Hall, supra note 21, at § 15.2. However, circumstances may evolve during the
stop which could justify a frisk. Id.
77. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23 (stating "[w]e are now concerned with more than the
governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest
of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing
is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.") Id
78. Id. at 24.
79. Id. at 26.
80. Id. at 27.
81. See 1-15 Hall, supra note 21, at §15.2 for a discussion on the severability of stop
and frisk.
82. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
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by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." 83 if
the search is limited to a pat down of areas on the detainee from which
he could conceivably reach a concealed weapon, the search has been
conducted reasonably. 84 The frisk must be limited to finding a weapon.
"[G]eneral exploratory searches" to find any "evidence of criminal
activity" are strictly prohibited.85
C. The Administrative Search Exception
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has defined
administrative searches as "searches conducted as part of a general
regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather
than as vart of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of
crime. . ." 6 While the need for probable cause applies to "any
government intrusion on private property,"87 the type of probable
cause required for administrative searches is much less than in
standard criminal searches: "[w]here considerations of health and
safety are involved, the facts that would justify an inference of
'probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly different from those
that would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has
been undertaken."88 Prior to Terry, the Supreme Court decided two
key administrative search cases: Camara v. Municipal Court89 and See
v. City of Seattle.90 In these cases, the Court balanced the interests of
regulatory enforcement against the Fourth Amendment's demand for
individual privacy. 91 The rulings in those cases stated that officials
who conduct administrative searches may practice a lesser standard of
probable cause than that required in criminal cases 92 "because the
inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of
evidence of crime[;] they involve a relatively limited invasion of the
83. Id. at 18 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)).
84. Id. at 30 (Officer McFadden only patted down Terry's outer clothing. He did not put
his hands in Terry's pockets or under his clothing).
85. Id.
86. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 at 908 (9th Cir. 1973) (following the Supreme
Court decisions of United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309 (1971); Camera v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) and See v. City
of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
87. 2-34 Hall, supra note 21, at §34.1.
88. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 538, (1967).
89. Id.
90. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
91. Camara, 387 U.S. at 540; see, 387 U.S. at 545-46.
92. 1-15 Hall, supra note 21, at §15.3.
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urban citizen's privacy."93 As the Court would soon decide in Terry,
"traditional Fourth Amendment protections" become impractical in
certain search and seizure situations. 94 Thus, "the Court had to find a
middle ground to accommodate the weighty competing public and
private interests." 95
The Ninth Circuit found that "middle ground" when it ruled in
United States v. Aukai9 6 that airport searches are indeed administrative
searches. 97 The Supreme Court has not definitively ruled upon this
issue but has suggested that airport searches are indeed a form of
administrative search. 98 "[W]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion
serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy
expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether
it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized
suspicion in the particular context."99 In other words, if the
government's interest outweighs an individual's expectation of
privacy, the ensuing search and seizure may commence without a
warrant. 100 Passenger screening in an airport is obviously part of an
overall regulatory mandate to control aviation safety; stopping a
terrorist attack using an aircraft as a weapon is a very real and
overwhelming government concern. However, as Judge Friendly notes
in United States v. Edwards, the search must be conducted in good
93. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
94. See generally Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
95. 1-15 Hall, supra note 21, at § 15.3.
96. United States v. Aukai, 497 F. 3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
97. See also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004) (when judging the
constitutionality of a highway checkpoint, the Court states that a stop must be judged by "the
gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances
the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty" (quoting Brown
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174 at 181 (3rd Cir.
2006) (ruling that a TSA search is permissible under the administrative search exception); and
United States v. Davis, 482 F. 2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973) ("screening searches of airline
passengers are conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an
administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard
aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings. The essential purpose of the scheme is not to detect
weapons or explosives or to apprehend those who carry them, but to deter persons carrying
such material from seeking to board at all").
98. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989).
99. Id. at 665-66.
100. See id.
101. 49 U.S.C.S. §44901(a) ("The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall
provide for the screening of all passengers and property, including United States mail, cargo,
carry-on and checked baggage, and other articles, that will be carried aboard a passenger
aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air
transportation").
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faith and must be tailored to prevent the searches goal: to prevent air
piracy, hijacking or damage to passengers or the aircraft.
When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human
lives and millions of dollars of property inherent in the
pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, that danger
alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the
search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of
preventing hijacking or like damage and with
reasonable scope and the passenger has been given
advance notice of his liability to such a search so that
he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.102
If the search moves beyond these parameters, then the search
becomes unconstitutional.10 3
The stiff consequences of searching beyond the permissible
scope became a stark reality for the government in the unreasonable
search and seizure case of United States v. Fode Amadou Fofana.104 I
Fofana, TSA agents at the Port Columbus International Airport
conducted permissible security searches of Mr. Fofana. As a
selectee,s0 5  Mr. Fofana's person and luggage were subjected to
thorough secondary searches' 06 beyond the routine airport screening
procedures. 10 7 As part of these searches, a TSA agent discovered
102. United States v. Edwards, 498 F. 2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting United States
v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (Friendly, J. concurring).
103. See United States v. Fofana, 620 F. Supp. 2d 857, 866 (S.D. Ohio, 2009) (If a search
was "ramped-up" to detect evidence of crime after the "presence of weapons and explosives
had been ruled out, the search can no longer be justified under the administrative search
doctrine and suppression is appropriate.").
104. Id.
105. A selectee is a passenger who is selected for additional screening.
106. Secondary searches have been upheld as constitutional. See United States v.
Marquez, 410 F. 3d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 2005) ("The random, additional screening
procedure... satisfies the.. .reasonableness test for airport searches. The procedure is geared
toward detection and deterrence of airbourne terrorism, and its very randomness furthers these
goals.... Given the randomness, the limited nature of the intrusion, the myriad devices that can
be used to bring planes down, and the absence of any indicia of improper motive, we hold that
the random, more thorough screening... was reasonable.").
107. Mr. Fofana's bags and pocket contents were placed on the scanning belt. He then
walked through the metal detector. Fofana, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 859. No alarms were set off. Id.
He was then subjected to a pat down as well as a screen with a handheld wand. Id. His bags
were also hand searched and swabbed for explosive trace. Id. No items on the prohibited items
list were discovered during these searches. The TSA has a prohibited items list that is posted
for all airplane passengers to review prior to flight. Such items include guns, knives, razors,
potentially explosive chemicals, etc. For a full list of these items, see TSA, Prohibited Items
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sealed and unsealed envelopes.o Upon opening most of the unsealed
envelopes, the agent discovered money.109 The other unsealed
envelopes" i0 contained three fake passports. Mr. Fofana was arrested
for carrying fake passports."'
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
excluded the fake passports as fruit of an unconstitutional search."12
Administrative airport searches balance an individual's right of
privacy against the government's interest in preventing catastrophic
destruction.' 1 3 "Therefore, an airport security search is reasonable if:
(1) the search is 'no more extensive or intensive than necessary, in
light of current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or
explosives;' (2) the search 'is confined in good faith to that purpose;'
and (3) a potential passenger may avoid the search by choosing not to
fly."1 4 According to the court, Mr. Fofana's person and luggage had
been cleared of containing any type of potential weapon or explosive
device. 5  Indeed, the TSA agent testified that in opening the
envelopes, she was no longer looking for weapons or explosives, but
was looking for illegal documentation or contraband.1 6 At that point,
all searching should have stopped.'" 7 Under the administrative search
exception to the Fourth Amendment, searching for the purpose of
finding evidence of "general criminal activity is improper."" 8
In another improper airport search and seizure case, Steven
Bierfeldt, treasurer for the Campaign for Liberty, was stopped and
questioned by TSA agents because he was carrying $4,700 in cash
for Travelers, http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/prohibited/permitted-prohibited-
items.shtm (last visited Dec. 27, 2009).
108. Fofana, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 860.
109. Money is not on the prohibited items list (see supra note 107) although large
quantities of money can be seen as indicia of criminal activity. See Fofana, 620 F. Supp. 2d at
860.
110. Mr. Fofana claimed that all the envelopes were sealed. Fofana, 620 F. Supp. 2d at
860 n. 1.
111. Id. at861.
112. Id. at 865.
113. See generally the premise in Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989).
114. Fofana, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 862 (quoting United States v. Aukai, 497 F. 3d 955, 962
(9th Cir. 2007)).
115. Id. at 864.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 863.
118. Id. See also City of Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. 32 at 37-42 (2000)
(administrative searches may not be used to find "evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing"); Davis, 482 F. 2d at 909 (noting a real danger that screening passengers for
weapons and explosives to could turned into a general search looking for evidence of a crime).
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from campaign sales. The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU")
sued the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security, alleging
that Mr. Bierfeldt's experience was not uncommon. The ACLU filed
suit in the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia, stating,
"[w]hether as a matter of formal policy or widespread practice, TSA
now operates on the belief that airport security screening provides a
convenient opportunity to fish for evidence of criminal conduct far
removed from the agency's mandate of ensuring flight safety." 1 9
Such a declaration begs the question: is the TSA in fact moving
beyond the restrictions imposed on airport searches? The TSA is
required to look for evidence of weapons and explosives.120 However,
once a search has revealed neither, continuing to question passengers
about cash, credit cards, or prescription drugs appears to stretch the
boundaries of airport security.121 Indeed, in 2007, Kip Hawley, the
TSA's administrator, stated, "[i]n this kind of environment, you can't
be sure they are going to come to the checkpoint with a prohibited
item, per se. Unless you do something more than that, you are going to
miss the next attack."l22 In June, 2009, Gale Rossides then acting TSA
administrator, testified before Congress that TSA had "moved past"
trying to intercept weapons to "physical and behavioral screening to
counter constantly changing threats," meaning SPOT.123 The problem
is that this type of searching goes beyond its permitted scope. 124 "A
limited administrative search cannot also serve unrelated law
enforcement purposes." 25 When the TSA crosses this line, its searches
become unconstitutional. 126
119. Scott McCartney, Is Tougher Airport Screening Going Too Far?, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, July 16, 2009 available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204556804574261940842372518.html.
120. See TSA, Prohibited Items for Travelers,
http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/prohibited/permitted-prohibited-items.shtm (last visited
Dec. 27, 2009)
121. McCartney, supra note 119.
122. Wilber and Nakashima, Searching Passengers' Faces for Subtle Clues to Terror,
WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2007, at DOI.
123. McCartney, supra note 119.
124. See Davis, 482 F. 2d at 1254. The Seattle airport had established a relationship-
which included a reward-between the Flight Terminal Security ("FTS") officers and other
law enforcement officers where FTS officers would routinely report drug and currency
violations.
125. Id. at 1246.
126. See generally United States v. Fofana, 620 F. Supp. 2d 857 (S.D. Ohio, 2009).
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D. The Airport Search: A Possible Hybrid of Terry and Administrative
Searches?
In Terry, the stopping officer was investigating "suspicious
circumstances."1 27 The officer watched Terry and his companion for
what had to be several minutes as the two paced back and forth in front
of the store window.' 28 When questioned at trial, the officer added,
". . they didn't look right to me at the time."12 9  Suspicious
circumstances such as these are exactly what BDOs want to detect.
Essentially, BDOs are looking for people that "don't look right."
However, the Supreme Court is clear that the protections of the Fourth
Amendment extend to all persons whether they are in a private
residence or on a public street.' 30 Thus, these protections irrevocably
extend to persons in a very public airport. On a street, people
reasonably believe they will be free from police interrogation. In other
words, a person has a reasonable "expectation of privacy" in just
walking down the street. 13 1 However, a person's expectation of
privacy is substantially diminished in an airport terminal.132 After
9/11, the increase of airport security was widely publicized and indeed
welcomed by the flying population. 133 Passengers' pleas of ignorance
that they did not know they would be stopped or screened before
boarding a plane is no longer legitimate. 134
127. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4, (1968).
128. Id. at 6.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 8-9.
131. See Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
132. See Fla. v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000) (noting that a reasonable expectation of
privacy is diminished in airports). See also United States v. Mora-Santana, 99 Fed. Appx. 397,
401 (2004) (noting that "privacy expectations of travelers at the airport are extremely low").
133. See Editorial, Bus Security Still Has Kinks, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS Nov. 9,
2001 at 6B (noting that "Americans have voiced few complaints recently as extra security
measures have increased their waiting time in lines at airports"); Mullener, Elizabeth, How
We've Changed, TIMES-PICAYUNE (NEW ORLEANS, LA), Sept. 8, 2002 at I (stating that
"nobody is complaining about the hassle of increased airport security"); Wascoe, Dan, A
Flying Start for Airport Screeners, STAR TRIBUNE (MINNEAPOLIS, MN), Oct. 24, 2002 at IB
(stating that passengers going through security checkpoints "didn't mind because they
understood the reasons"); Silverman, Adam, Passengers Adapt to Airport Security, THE
BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Dec. 29, 2003 at IB (stating that passengers understand airport
precautions and don't mind extra searches or longer waits); Editorial, Terror Warning in
Holiday Season, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (TENNESSEE), Dec. 23, 2003 at B6 (stating
that tightened security is "welcome and reassuring");
134. See Hartwell, 436 F. 3d at 181 ("[a]ir passengers choose to fly, and screening
procedures of this kind have existed in every airport in the country since at least 1974. The
events of September 11, 2001, have only increased their prominence in the public's
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Part Terry, part administrative search, airport searches appear
to be a type of search unique unto themselves. Airport security
searches are arguably a "hybrid of stop and frisk and administrative
searches. They are administrative searches when they are passively
initiated and stop and frisk when suspicion is created and they are
actively concluded by governmental action."' 35 The initial contact
between passenger and airport security could be classified as an
administrative search because "the prospective airline passenger
merely walks through a magnetometer and sends his or her carry-on
baggage through an x-ray machine."l36 No Terry stop has occurred-no
passenger has been specifically targeted for questioning and the airport
screening procedures are far less invasive that a traditional stop; while
the searches may be somewhat "inconvenient," they "are experienced
by the entire airplane-riding public."l 37
When a passenger is singled out for additional questioning due
to his behavior, the screening process arguably becomes a Terry stop.
The airport detention now very much mirrors a street detention as
described in Terry. At this point, the BDOs must have reasonable
suspicion to stop the passenger. 138 The main question now becomes
whether the suspicious behavior targeted by BDOs is enough to rise to
this Terry requirement. Considering what the TSA has released as the
type of behaviors the BDOs look for, one could argue that it does.
Nervously pacing, watching the crowd, and unexplainable sweating in
an airport could certainly equal the erratic behaviors exhibited by
Terry and his companions on that city street corner. 139 As noted above,
the behavior validates the stop at its inception. 140 If the TSA agents
only briefly question and then release the passenger, the stop is valid
as conducted.141 If the agent questions the passenger and then detains
that person for further questioning and, perhaps, further searching, the
screening procedure has moved beyond Terry or administrative
searching. 2 The screening now turns into a full seizure under the
consciousness. It is inconceivable that Hartwell was unaware that he had to be searched before
he could board a plane").
135. 2-32 Hall, supra note 21, at §32.11.
13 6. Id.
137. Id.
138. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
139. Behavior Detection Program Hitting Stride with TSA, SecuritySolutions.com, Jan. 8,
2008 http://securitysolutions.com/news/tsa-behavior-detection/.
140. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23.
141. Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436 at 455 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
142. Id. at 456-57.
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Fourth Amendment and probable cause is now necessary to
continue. 143
In the airport context, the search component of "search and
seizure" is even more problematic. An airport pat down serves the
same compelling public interest served in a Terry frisk: neutralizing
weapons and explosives.144 However, the Court is clear in Terry that
the suspect must have easy access to the weapon so that the officer is
in fear for his/her safety.145 In an airport, the weapon may not be
intended to hurt the examining agent. In fact, the "weapon" may not be
a weapon at all, but parts of a weapon that could be assembled once
aboard the plane. 146 Arguably, searching for this type of weapon
during a pat down (or frisk) goes beyond the limited scope outlined by
the Court. According to Terry, frisks are constitutional only to find
threats of imminent danger.147 Thus, if the weapon has to be
assembled, it technically is not yet an imminent threat. Yet prior to
9/11, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Moreno,148 stated that "[d]ue
to the gravity of the air piracy problem, we think that the airport. . is a
critical zone in which special fourth amendment considerations
apply." 4 9 If airport security were confined to only a limited pat-down
search where there is a real possibility of a terrorist threat, the
restriction would be "self-defeating."15  Thus, the overwhelming
interest in preventing such disasters which could be completed with
the smallest of weapons or explosives that could easily be missed
during a Terry frisk is far greater than any intrusion inflicted upon the
passenger being searched.
Additionally, the officer in Terry also had the right to search
for weapons to protect those in the surrounding area.' 5 Clearly, the
potential for destruction and loss of human life if a terrorist were to
complete his/her mission affects not only those in the immediate area,
but everyone who flies. A successful attack cripples the airport where
the attack occurred, the people within that airport, and all other
14 3. Id.
144. "The lesson of 9/11 .. can be simply stated: in the new age of terror,...we...are the
primary targets. The losses America suffered that day demonstrated both the gravity of the
terrorist threat and the commensurate need to prepare ourselves to meet it." 9/11 REPORT 323.
145. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
146. See Harvey Simon, Screen Air Passengers for Bombs, Use Watch Lists, Commission
Says, 3 HOMELAND SECURITY & DEFENSE 3, July 28, 2004.
147. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
148. 475 F. 2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973).
149. Id. at 5 1.
150. Id.
151. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
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airports which must then heighten security, restrict flights, or shut-
down completely. If would-be terrorists are in possession of a weapon
or explosive that could potentially harm the passengers around them,
not only in the terminal, but on the airplane, under the idea of
protecting those around them, the agent performing a more invasive
search than a Terry pat down is still within the limited scope of Terry
and the ensuing searches are constitutional.
E. A BriefNote on Consent
Airport screening is not a new occurrence in American airports.
Indeed, airport screening has been commonplace both in the United
States as well as throughout the world for nearly three decades.152
Airline passengers are warned many times, from the purchasing of a
ticket to arriving at the airport, that screening of their persons and
carry-on baggage will occur. Anyone who enters the concourse of an
airport is virtually charged with the knowledge that screening is
required.153 Such as with flying, persons who partake in activities in
which there is an overwhelming public interest implicitly grant
consent to those conducting searches to serve the public interest.1 54
Anyone who refuses to submit to the search will not be permitted to
pass into the sterile area'55 of the airport.156 In fact, some courts have
held that once the screening process has begun at the security
checkpoint, the passenger no longer has a constitutional right to revoke
152. 2-32 Hall, supra note 21, at §32.12. On Dec 5, 1972, the FAA issued a landmark
anti-hijacking emergency rule requiring all U.S. air carriers "to inspect all carry-on baggage
for weapons or other dangerous objects and scan each passenger with a metal detector
(magnetometer) before boarding or, if a detector was not available, conduct a physical search,
or pat down." FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, FAA HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY, 1926-
1996 http://www.faa.gov/about/media/b-chron.pdf
153. 2-32 Hall, supra note 21, at §32.12.
154. 2-34 Hall, supra note 21, at §32.22.
155. The sterile area of the airport is that area "within the terminal where passengers are
provided access to boarding aircraft and access is controlled in accordance with TSA
requirements." UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, GAO-10-128, supra
note 6.
156. 49 CFR 1540.105(a)(2) ("[n]o person may: Enter, or be present within...a sterile
area without complying with the systems, measures, or procedures being applied to control
access to, or presence or movement in, such areas."); 49 CFR 1540.107(a) ("No individual
may enter a sterile area or board an aircraft without submitting to the screening and inspection
of his or her person and accessible property in accordance with the procedures being applied
to control access to that area or aircraft under this subchapter.").
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the consent.15 7 The passenger cannot attempt to enter the sterile area
and then "beat a retreat if the search proves not to his liking." 58
III. PROFILING: A NECESSARY EVIL IN FIGHTING TERRORISTS
A. The Hifacker Profile
The term "profiling" has been defined in many different ways
by many different sources. Generally, the term encompasses the
tendency of law enforcement officers to rely on race, ethnicity, or
national origin to select individuals for "routine investigatory
activities."15 9 Profiling, especially racial profiling, is not a new concept
in American history. 60 Before terrorists using airplanes as bombs
became the main focus of airport security, aircraft hijackings were the
overwhelming threat to the nation's skies. 16 1 To combat the growing
number of hijackings in the 1960's, the "hijacker profile" was
developed in 1969 by the Federal Aviation Administration's ("FAA")
157. 49 CFR 1540.111(a)(1) ("an individual may not have a weapon, explosive, or
incendiary, on or about the individual's person or accessible property-[w]hen performance has
begun of the inspection of the individual's person or accessible property before entering a
sterile area, or before boarding an aircraft for which screening is conducted under this
subchapter"). See also United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F. 2d 773 (11 th Cir. 1984).
158. Herzbrun, 723 F. 2d 773, 776 ("[s]uch an option would constitute a one-way street
for the benefit of a party planning airport mischief, since there is no guarantee that if he were
allowed to leave he might not return and be more successful," quoting United States v.
Skipwith, 482 F. 2d 1272, 1281 (5th Cir. 1973)).
159. End Racial Profiling Act, S. 989, 107th Congress, Section 501 (2001) (this act is now
dead, as are the 2004 and 2007 reintroduced versions). For additional variations on the
definition of racial profiling, see Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution,
2002 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM 163 at n.24 (2002).
160. The term profiling is generally believed to come from the method of identifying and
intercepting drug couriers in the 1970's. NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE ON RACE AND
JUSTICE, HISTORY OF RACIAL PROFILING ANALYSIS, DATA COLLECTION RESOURCE CENTER
http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/background/history.php (last visited Jan. 6, 2010).
See also Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10 ("Since 1974, the DEA has trained narcotics officers to
identify drug smugglers on the basis of... circumstantial evidence...."). However, singling out
people because of the color of their skin dates back to before the Civil War. Anita L. Willis,
The Roots of Racial Profiling, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY'S HISTORY NEWS NETWORK, Dec.
23, 2002 http:/Ihnn.us/articles/ 167.html (prior to the Civil War, the Free Negro Registry "was
a means of identifying and tracking so-called Free Persons of Color").
161. In 1969, eighty-seven aircrafts were hijacked as compared to only thirty-seven in
1968. U.S. aircrafts were involved in forty of these hijackings. FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, FAA HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY, 1926-1996, supra note 152. On March 17,
1970, the first death in a United States domestic hijacking occurred. The hijacker shot and
fatally wounded the copilot on an Eastern Air Lines shuttle from Newark to Boston. The
captain, also wounded, was able to safely land his aircraft. Before he died, the copilot was able
to shoot the hijacker with his own gun. Id.
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Task Force on Deterrence of Air Piracy.' 6 2 The Task Force constructed
the hijacker profile, a "characteristic-based passenger profile" to be
used along with magnetometers to screen for potential hijackers in
American airports.163 The profile was actually tested at nine airports
with the testers concluding that "no more than 2 percent of the flying
public triggered enough of those characteristics to be detained." 64
With airplane hijackings reaching their pinnacle in the
1970's,165 American courts starting taking these ever-present terroristic
threats very seriously. Balancing the governmental interest against
personal privacy, the Fifth Circuit ruled that using a profile to discover
hijackers before they took the opportunity to complete their purpose
was not only constitutional but was also necessary:
Although the problem of aerial hijacking is well known
to the public, we think it appropriate, nevertheless, to
single out our reasons for treating airport security
searches as an exceptional and exigent situation under
the Fourth Amendment. Obviously, in order to
jeopardize the lives and safety of the smallest number
of people, the hijacker must be discovered when he is
least dangerous to others and when he least expects
confrontation with the police. In practical terms, this
means while he is still on the ground and before he has
166taken any overt action.
Although the type of airplane hijackings experienced in the
1970's have been overtaken by insidious suicide bombings, the
original hijacker profile is still used in American airports and is a
constitutionally tested practice of singling out would-be threats. In
162. Id.
163. David Brown, Letter to the Editor: Tracing the FAA's Warnings, WASH POST, Feb.
16, 2005 (NOTE: David Brown was the press officer for the Task Force on Deterrence of Air
Piracy). See also FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, FAA HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY, 1926-
1996, supra note 152 (a hijacker profile could be constructed using the characteristics of past
perpetrators).
164. Brown, supra note 163. On July 17, 1970, "New Orleans' Moisant International
Airport became the first U.S. airport to subject all passengers to the FAA-developed
[behavioral] anti-hijacking screening system." FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, FAA
HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY, 1926-1996, supra note 152. Only eighteen months after
establishing the Task Force, the FAA replaced it with the Air Operations Security Division of
the newly renamed Office of Air Transportation Security. Id.
165. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, FAA HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY, 1926-1996,
supra note 152.
166. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 48-49 (5th Cir. 1973).
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United States v. Lopez-Pages,167 Lopez-Pages purchased a ticket for a
flight from Orlando to Dallas. 68 The ticket agent observed
characteristics that matched the FAA hijacker profile and noted this
observation by writing the word "CODE" on Lopez-Pages' ticket
envelope. 69 Lopez-Pages was then told he would need to submit to a
search as he fit the hijacker profile.' 70 Lopez-Pages and a companion
passed through the magnetometer without incident and then were
taken to a separate security room where Lopez-Pages was patted
down. The pat down revealed marijuana and cocaine.172 He was
arrested and convicted of possession and intent to distribute.173 The
Eleventh Circuit, in affirming the district court's conviction, reiterated
the critical nature of airport security checkpoints, requiring less than
probable cause or even reasonable suspicion to perform a search.
Calling this lesser standard "mere suspicion," the court ruled that
"facts establishing the hijacker profile are sufficient to provide the
requisite 'mere suspicion' necessary to conduct the searches in this
case."174
B. The Race Factor: A Permissible Element that Cannot Stand Alone
Although many factors make up law enforcement profiles,
none are as suspect as race. Under a drug profile, race cannot be the
sole basis for the profile.' 75 However, race may be considered as part
of a profile as long as other factors are present. 17 In Whren v. United
States,177 the Court, concerned about the potential misuse of Terry to
rationalize racially motivated preventative police work, reiterated the
need for objective justification as the basis of a Terry stop under the
Fourth Amendment: "[w]e of course agree with petitioners that the
Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting
to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal
Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions
167. 767 F. 2d. 776 (11th Cir. 1985).





173. Id. at 777-78.
174. Id at 778.
175. 2-32 Hall, supra note 21, at §32.6.
176. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
177. Id.
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play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis."' 78 In other words, the Court's ruling appears to condone
racial profiling (or using race as a "suspicious factor") as a subjective
factor as long as the officer can also articulate objective factors that a
reasonable person would also find suspicious in the surrounding
circumstances.
While the history of hijacker and drug courier profile cases
certainly acts as guidance for courts confronted with law enforcement
using race as a means to prevent crime, perhaps nothing in America's
judicial past could prepare the courts for the "profiling" cases to come
after 9/11. In 2008, the U.S. District Court for Eastern District of New
York became the first court to consider racial profiling in an airport
screening case post 9/11. In Farag v. United States,179 several police
officers detained two Arabs, Farag and his friend, Elmasry, for four
and a half hours, seizing them as soon as they deplaned from their
flight from San Diego to New York City. 80 The counterterrorism
officers who were sued (collectively the "Government") contended
that the agents conducted a valid Terry stop, or, if the stop was deemed
an arrest, they had requisite probable cause.' 8' The agents sought to
justify the arrests by putting together, what the court called, a "number
of benign circumstances in the apparent belief that their numerosity
[would] carry the day." 82 The court refused to give credence to their
suspicions: "[y]et, even viewing all of these circumstances as a whole,
it cannot rationally be held that if, hypothetically, the plaintiffs were
two Caucasian traveling companions speaking French, or another non-
Arabic language which the agents did not understand, 'a person of
reasonable caution' would have believed that they were engaged in
terrorist surveillance." 83 The District Court in Farag did not shy away
from the fact that its case was the first case after 9/11 to consider
whether race could be considered as a factor to establish criminal
propensity; but ignoring the overwhelming temptation to allow what it
considered unconstitutional principles, it refused to validate using race
to further the security of the country.' 84
178. Id at 813.
179. 587 F. Supp. 2d 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
180. Id. at 442.
181. Id
182. Id. at 458.
183. Id.
184. Id at 467-68.
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Yet, the Supreme Court clearly requires a different type of
analysis. In United States v. Arvizu, 1 the Court stated that all
reasonable, articulated suspicions (as mandated in Terry) must be
considered as a whole; courts must "take into account 'the totality of
the circumstances"' when evaluating the individual observations that
caused the officer to act.' 8 ' As in Whren,'18  the Court in Arvizu
believed that numerosity does "carry the day." Even if race played a
role in the initial stop, the Court plainly stated in Whren that race may
be used to support reasonable suspicion as long as it is combined with
other objective factors. Although the District Court in Farag granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, it did not follow the
rulings of the Supreme Court when it refused to allow race as one
factor to validate reasonable suspicion. Arguably, the court was in
error by refusing the agents' articulated factors for stopping Farag.188
Race is a valid factor when considered within the totality of the
circumstances. 189
In 2006,190 a highly publicized incident unequivocally
demonstrated just how prevalent racial profiling has become when
dealing with airport security. The incident is now known simply as
"The Flying Imams"l91 case. The Flying Imamsl 92 controversy began
with the removal of six imams from US Airways Flight 300 from
Minneapolis to Phoenix on November 20, 2006.193 Passengers became
alarmed by what they perceived as suspicious or "unsettling" behavior
by the imams.' 94 One passenger captured the suspicious activities in a
185. 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002).
186. Id. (noting that Terry precludes a "divide-and-conquer" analysis; each of a series of
acts may be innocent, but when taken together, may warrant "further investigation"). Id.
187. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
188. See supra note 179.
189. But see United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F. 3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000). In ruling
that Hispanic appearance is not a relevant factor when proving particularized or individualized
suspicion, the Ninth Circuit states, "[s]tops based on race or ethnic appearance send the
underlying message to all our citizens that those who are not white are judged by the color of
their skin alone. Such stops also send a clear message that those who are not white enjoy a
lesser degree of constitutional protection-that they are in effect assumed to be potential
criminals first and individuals second." Id. at 1135.
190. Shqeirat v. United States Airways Group, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 765 (D. Minn.
2009). Although the incident occurred in 2006, the U.S. District Court in Minnesota did not
decide the matter until 2009 thus keeping Farag as the first case to consider race after 9/11.
191. Imam is a "prayer leader of a mosque": a sinless, divine Muslim leader and
successor to Mohammad. Shabazz v. Martin, No. 00-73005, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70342, at
*5 (D. Mich. Sep. 24, 2007).
192. Shqeirat, 645 F. Supp. 2d 765.
193. Id. at 774.
194. Id. at 785.
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note then passed the note to a flight attendant prior to departure.' 9 5
According to the police report, these behaviors included negative
statements about President Bush and the Iraq war; negative statements
about the death of Saddam Hussein; loud prayers to "Allah" while
waiting in the lobby;196 seat changes to spread out on the plane (which
was done by the terrorists on 9/11); one-way tickets held by three of
the imams; and no checked baggage.' 9 7
The Minnesota police listed the type of incident as "Suspicious
Activity." 98 Officer Brad Wingate, one of the officers dispatched to
the scene, met with the U.S. Airways Manager who not only told the
officers that the imams were acting suspiciously, he also mentioned
they were of Middle Eastern descent.199 Wingate then conferred with
the Federal Air Marshall on the scene and decided all the actions taken
together amounted to "suspicious behavior." 200 The suspects, after
being detained for an hour on the jetway, were handcuffed, patted
down and their carry-on bags were sniffed by a drug dog.201 They were
then led down the outside stairs of the jetway (in full view of the other
passengers) and transported to the Airport Police Department Police
Operations Center and placed in holding cells where they were held
for approximately five to six hours.2 Ultimately, no imam was
charged.203 The imams sued, among others, the federal agent, police
officers and airport authority on multiple charges including a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.2
The FBI agent admitted that the imams were arrested rather
205than simply being stopped. As their seizure went beyond a Terry
stop and quickly became a full-blown arrest, the agent and police
195. Idat 772-73.
196. Id. at 771. The imams were praying "Allahu Akbar!" meaning "God is great." While
a seemingly innocuous prayer, "The very last human sound on the cockpit voice recorder of
United Flight 93 before it screamed into the ground at 580 miles per hour is the sound of male
voices shouting "Allahu Akbar" in a moment of religious ecstasy." Debra Burlingame, On a
Wing anda Prayer, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2006 at Al6.
197. AIRPORT POLICE DEPARTMENT, MINNESOTA REPORT FORM




200. Shqeirat, 645 F. Supp. at 773.
201. AIRPORT POLICE DEPARTMENT, MINNESOTA REPORT FORM




204. Id. at 777.
205. Id. at 778.
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officers needed probable cause to meet constitutional standards. "An
officer has probable cause for an arrest 'when the totality of the
circumstances demonstrates that a prudent person would believe that
the arrestee has committed or was committing a crime."' 206 According
to the court, nothing the imams had done prior to the arrest was a
crime; "praying in public, commenting on current events, and even
criticizing governmental policy is protected speech under the First
Amendment." 207 Since the imams had not committed a crime, the
defendants did not have probable cause. 208 By arresting them, the
defendants violated the imams' Fourth Amendment rights. 0 9
Although basing her ruling on probable cause, Judge
Montgomery continued her reasoning by focusing on the race of the
detainees. In her words, "[p]laintiffs' Middle Eastern descent does not
change the analysis. Similar behavior by Russian Orthodox priests or
Franciscan monks would likely not have elicited this response." 2 10 The
Judge also refused to accept the "9/11 claim" argued by certain
defendants, "that the attacks of September 11, 200 1-perpetrated by
men of Middle Eastern descent who espoused a radical version of
Islam-justifies a massive curtailment of liberty whenever terrorism,
and in this case, the suspicion of Islamic terrorism, is concerned." 2 11 In
denying this argument, the court remained focused on the Constitution
and the need to defend its protections regardless of the circumstances:
"[u]nquestionably the events of 9/11 changed the calculus in the
balance American society chooses to make, especially in airport
settings, between liberty and security. But when a law enforcement
officer exercises the power of the Sovereign over its citizens, she or he
has a responsibility to operate within the bounds of the Constitution
and cannot raise the specter of 9/11 as an absolute exception to that
responsibility." 2 12
While the imams ultimately won their case because the acting
agents did not possess probable cause, they may not have won under
the reasonable suspicion standard promulgated under Terry. The fact
that the defendants used race and religion as two factors to justify their
detention of the plaintiffs would not be fatal to their argument under a
Terry claim. As long as the officers could supply other factors to
206. Id. at 778 (quoting Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F. 3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999)).
207. Id. at 786.
208. Id. at 779.
209. Id
210. Id. at 786.
211. Id. at 788.
212. Id
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support their assessment of the situation, the Fourth Amendment
would be satisfied.213
Interestingly, soon after the incident occurred (but prior to
trial), "official" probes into the removal of the imams found that the
removals were not racially biased.214 US Airways, the Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS") and the Air Carrier Security Committee
of the Air Line Pilots Association all investigated the decisions made
by the parties involved. "We believe the ground crew and employees
acted correctly and did what they are supposed to do," Andrea Rader, a
US Airways spokeswoman said.215 Russ Knocke, spokesman for the
DHS said, "There is no indication there is any inappropriate activity, at
least no indication at this time," callin the review "a fairly routine
practice with incident's like this." 2 1  The Air Carrier Security
Committee's report concluded, "The crew's actions were strictly in
compliance with procedures and demonstrated overall good judgment
in the care and concern for their passengers, fellow crew members, and
the company. The decisions made by all the parties were made as a
result of the behavior of the passengers and not as a result of their
ethnicity." 217
It should also not be forgotten that the entire incident began
when the other passengers got "nervous" at the behavior of these
Middle Eastern clerics and expressed their concern to the airline
employees.218 Although most Americans espouse an anti-profiling
attitude, these passengers had no reservations in calling attention to
relatively benign behaviors only because Arabs exhibited them. In the
tense airport atmosphere following 9/11, the imams should have
known better. Espousing anti-American sentiments while loudly
praying in Arabic at a U.S. airport gate would, without a doubt, attract
attention. Any reasonable citizen who had remotely heard of 9/11
would find this behavior troubling if not dangerous. Congress agreed:
as a result of this incident, new legislation was passed protecting
citizens from prosecution when they report suspicious behaviors to
authorities. 2 19 President Bush signed H.R. 1401, 1 10 th Cong. (1st Sess.
213. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).





218. Shqeirat v. United States Airways Group, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 765 (D. Minn.
2009).
219. H.R. 1401, 1 10 th Cong. (I" Sess. 2007) (codified at 6 U.S.C. §1104(e)).
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2007) into law on Aug. 3, 2007.220 Rep. Peter King of New York
introduced this bill two weeks after the plaintiffs in "The Flying
Imams" case filed their complaint against the reporting passengers
aboard Flight 300. The law now protects private individuals who
221
report suspicious activity, including passengers aboard airplanes.
Not surprisingly, the text of the law mirrors the Terry standard of
objective reasonable suspicion: "[a]ny person who, in good faith and
based on objectively reasonable suspicion, makes, or causes to be
made, a voluntary report of covered activity to an authorized official
shall be immune from civil liability under Federal, State, and local law
for such report." 222 As race may be used as a factor under Terry as
long as there are other factors to support the stop, race may be an
initial factor for citizens to consider as long as they can articulate other
objective factors which led them to their reasonable suspicion.223
The defendants ended up settling with the imams in order to
avoid the expense of an ongoing lawsuit. 224 Since the settlement,
concerns have now arisen on all sides that the case will have a chilling
effect on identifying and catching potential terrorists. 225 One columnist
for the Star Tribune in Minneapolis went so far as to state that Judge
Montgomery "aided and abetted" the imams' victory, acting
"arrogantly dismissive of law-enforcement realities." 226 Even Muslims
are leery of the precedent being set by the settlement. 227 Zuhdi Jasser,
chairman of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy wonders if
the result will cause future pilots to avoid making the quick decision
which may ultimately protect the lives of everyone onboard. He was
quoted in USA Today as saying "[p]eople are going to wonder: Am I
going to be another captain who will end up costing my employer X
220. Although the law was signed on Aug. 3, 2007, it is retroactive back to Oct. 1, 2006,
one month prior to the imams incident. 6 U.S.C. § 1104(e).
221. 6 U.S.C. §1104. Immunity for reports of suspected terrorist activity or suspicious
behavior and response.
222. 6 U.S.C. §1 104(a)(1).
223. Shqeirat, 645 F. Supp. 2d 775 n. 3 (noting that the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed
their complaint against the civilians in Aug. 2007 after the legislation was passed).
224. Flying Imams'Settlement Carries Cost for Air Safety, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2009 at
10A.
225. See generally Stu Bykofsky, Flying on a Wing and an Unfamiliar Prayer, THE
PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, Jan. 25, 2010 (arguing that the imams' behavior was provocative
and they were rewarded for it).
226. Katherine Kersten, Flying Imam' Case is Settled at Our Expense, STAR TRIBUNE,
Oct. 25, 2009 at 30P.
227. See Oren Dorell, Imams Settle Case Over '06 Flight Removal, USA TODAY, Oct. 21,
2009 at 3A.
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dollars because I made a bad decision that was a bit quick." 2 28 This
type of "second-guessing" simply cannot stand if American skies are
to remain terrorist free: "[t]he day we tell the captain of a commercial
airliner that he cannot remove a problem passenger unless he divines
beyond question what is in that passenger's head and heart is the day
our commercial aviation system begins to crumble." 229
The First Circuit took a different view of a very similar
situation. In Cerqueira v. American Airlines, Inc.,230 Cerqueira
claimed, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,231 that he was illegally removed from
American Airlines Flight 2237 from Boston to Fort Lauderdale.232 He
claimed that he was removed and then denied rebooking because of his
race. 233 The airlines countered his claim, stating that under 49 U.S.C.
§44902, the airline had a legal right to refuse to transport the passenger
if it felt he was "or might be, inimical to safety." 234 In practice and as a
matter of law,235 the Captain, as pilot in command, "stands in the role
of the air carrier for a decision to remove a passenger from a flight." 23 6
In support of his removal, the Captain of Flight 2237 took into
consideration at least nine separate factors which led him to ask
Cerqueira and his two "row mates" to leave the plane. 237 Taken
together, he believed these factors serious enough to bring the jetway
back to the plane and delay the takeoff.238 After the men were
removed, another passenger reported that one of the three men had box
cutters confiscated by TSA agents at the security checkpoint. 239 With
this additional knowledge, the Captain, with nearly seventeen years of
experience with American Airlines, decided to have all the passengers
disembark and have all the baggage removed so the plane could be
228. Id.
229. Burlingame, supra note 196.
230. 520 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008) (cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 111 (2008)).
231. 42 U.S.C. §1981 "Equal rights under the law: Statement of equal rights. All persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and
Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other." 42 U.S.C. §1981.
232. Cerqueira, 520 F. 3d at 4.
233. Id. at 10-11.
234. 49 U.S.C. §44902(b).
235. 14 C.F.R. §91.3(a)
236. Cerqueira, 520 F. 3d at 12.
237. Id at 4-8.
238. Id. at 7.
239. Id. at 7-8.
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thoroughly searched. 24 0 Although the plaintiff believed his appearance
was the reason for his removal,24' the Captain testified he could not
see the plaintiff from the front of the plane.242 The first time the
243Captain saw the plaintiff was at trial.
In applying §44902, courts must balance the need for airline
safety with the potential for racial discrimination. 244 The standard for
liability under the statute is the "arbitrary and capricious" standard:
"the air carrier's decision to refuse air transport must be shown to be
arbitrary or capricious." 24 5 In determining whether the refusal was
arbitrary or capricious in this case, the court applied four principles:
(1) the decision of the pilot in charge is the decision for the air carrier;
(2) review of that decision is limited to what the Captain knew at the
time the decision was made-not what he should have known; (3)
since the decision must be made quickly and expediently, the Captain
is entitled to rely upon the representations made to him about the
situation, even if reliance on those representations is mistaken; and (4)
biases of those giving information to the Captain cannot be attributed
to the Captain himself.246 In Cerqueira, the plaintiff presented no
evidence that the Captain acted out of racial bias. 24J Indeed, the
Captain, not having seen the plaintiff, did not even know of his Middle
Eastern appearance. If the Captain had based his judgment solely on
the plaintiffs appearance, the removal would have been arbitrary and
thus, illegal under §44902.248 Having been presented with other
objective and reasonably believable factors at the time of the incident
when the decision was made, his decision was valid.249
Advocates against profiling use the popular argument that the
9/11 attacks fueled a baseless racial hysteria within the United
States.250 Indeed, it does seem that prior to 9/11, racial profiling was
240. Id. at 8.
241. Id. at 10-11. The plaintiff had dark hair and olive colored skin as did the other two
men who were removed. The plaintiff was an American citizen. The other two men were
Israeli. Id. at 5.
242. Id at 9.
243, Id. at 9.
244. Id. at 14.
245. Id. at 14 (citing Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F. 2d 942, 948 (2d Cir.
1975)).
246. Id. at 14-15.
247. Id. at 17.
248. Id. at 17-18.
249. Id. at 17.
250. See Ally Hack, Forfeiting Liberty: A Collective Sense of Vulnerability and the Need
for Proactive Protection After 9/11, 2 CARDOZO PUBLIC LAw, Pot'Y & ETHICS J. 469, 514
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condemned by nearly everyone: the President, Congress, the Courts,
and the American people.2 1 Yet, what is proclaimed in public is not
necessarily the sentiments expressed in private. As evidence of this
fact, the White House was exploring the benefits of profiling nearly
five years prior to 9/11. In the "White House Commission on Aviation
Security and Safety Report" issued to President Clinton, the
Commission, chaired by then Vice President Al Gore, recommended
passenger profiling.252 Recommendation 3.19 advocated "passenger
profiling" to "leverage an investment in technology and trained
people." 53 By using profiling, "passengers could be separated into a
very large majority who present little or no risk, and a small minority
who merit additional attention." 254 While many political leaders may
publically demonize such overt profiling language, in private, most
Americans (as well as their leaders) understand the ever-growing
necessity of such potentially discriminating actions to further the
safety of the country.255
As a part of its profiling research, the Commission met with a
Civil Liberties Advisory Board to consider the potential for intrusion
upon and even denial of civil liberties to any American airline
passenger. Based on this meeting, the Commission recommended that
safeguards be placed on any profiling system. The first of these
safeguards was that "no profile should contain or be based on material
of a constitutionally suspect nature - e.g., race, religion, or national
,,256
origin of U.S. citizens. The profile must be based on
". . measurable, verifiable data indicating that the factors chosen are
reasonable predictors of risk, not stereotypes or generalizations. A
(May, 2004) ("The choice of security over liberty made by Americans after 9/11 was an
emotional one...").
251. Alschuler, supra note 159.
252. VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, CHAIRMAN, WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON AVIATION
SAFETY AND SECURITY, FINAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT CLINTON, Recommendation 3.19,
February 12, 1997 http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/212fin-1.html). The White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security was formally established Aug 21, 1996.
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, FAA HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY, 1926-1996, supra note
152.
253. GORE, WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY, FINAL
REPORT TO PRESIDENT CLINTON, supra note 252.
254. Id.
255. COMMITTEE OF LAW AND JUSTICE, ET. AL., PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAM ASSESSMENT, supra note 17.
As recent as December, 2006, over fifty percent of the United States population would favor
"extra checks" by airport personnel on passengers who appear to be of Middle-Eastern
descent. Id.
256. GORE, WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY, FINAL
REPORT TO PRESIDENT CLINTON, supra note 252.
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relationship must be demonstrated between the factors chosen and the
risk of illegal activity." 257 In fact, this recommendation is very similar
to the approach courts use today. Race may be considered as a factor
when stopping a passenger; it just cannot be the only factor used.258
However, many times, measurable factors fail in comparison to
the valued judgment of a well-trained and seasoned security agent. In
discussing the terrorists' attacks of 9/11, the 9/11 Commission praised
the inherent instincts of just such an agent: "[o]ne potential hijacker
was turned back by an immigration inspector as he tried to enter the
United States. The inspector relied on intuitive experience to ask
questions more than he relied on any objective factor that could be
,,259detected or "scored" by a machine. The 9/11 Report calls this
"screening," not "profiling." 260 Yet, it defines screening as looking for
"identifiable suspects or indicators of risk. 261 Arguably, looking for
"indicators of risk" is profiling. Unfortunately, an indicator of risk in
today's world of terrorism possibly includes ethnic origin.262 At the
airports, the SPOT program mandates watching for what could easily
be called "indicators of risk." 263 In Terry, the police officer articulated
the risk factors he observed when making the decision to stop and
ultimately frisk Terry and his companions. What may be an
uncomfortable truth is that now, ethnicity might just be as viable a risk
factor as staring in a store window one too many times.
After the attempted bombing on Christmas Day, 2009 aboard
Flight 253,264 the TSA quickly implemented new rules on domestic
passenger screening while also issuing what could be called blatant
ethnic profiling mandates when it decreed that all inbound passengers
from fourteen suspect countries must be subjected to more intense
screening than passengers from other countries. Notably, nearly every
country located in the Middle East is on the list as well as certain
African countries believed to have citizens with ties to terrorist
organizations.265 These enhanced screenings include full-body pat
257. Id.
258. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
259. 9/11 REPORT 387.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Associated Press, Bin Laden Purportedly Lauds Detroit Bomb Plot, MSNBC, Jan.
24, 2010 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35042867/ns/world news-mideastn africa//.
263. Transportation Security Administration, Behavior Detection Officers (BDO): Layers
of Security, supra note 14.
264. See supra, note 6.
265. Associated Press, Obama: Airline Attack was Preventable, MSNBC.com, Jan. 6,
2010 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34679532/ns/us-news-airliner-attack/. Countries include
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downs, carry-on baggage searches, full-body scanning, and explosives
detection. 26 However, according to the TSA, these new rules are not
profiling. As is apparently taught during TSA training, "[s]ingling out
people based on ethnicity or reli ion is verboten-but it's OK if it's
based on a person's nationality."26
IV. SPOT: LIMITED SUCCESSES AND MONUMENTAL FAILURES
The behavioral analysis done in the SPOT program may more
properly be called biobehavioral analysis. Biobehavorial analysis uses
outward physical manifestations to infer an attempt to mask illegal
intentions. BDOs, trained in SPOT, look for biobehaviors such a
facial expressions,26 9 vocalization, 270 fidgeting, reddening of face, or
profuse sweating.271 Many people believe that these biobehaviors are
"automatic" or involuntary. However, most of these behaviors can be
easily manipulated by an ordinary citizen: "[d]epending on the
robustness of the biobehavioral techniques involved, it may be
possible in the face of countermeasures for a subject to induce false
negatives by manipulating his or her behavior." 272 Indeed, with
practice, most people can become quite good at hiding their true
Algeria, Afghanistan, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Id.
266. Id.
267. Barbara S. Peterson, New TSA Rules: Dija vu All Over Again, CONDE NAST
TRAVELER, Jan. 4, 2010.
268. COMMITTEE OF LAW AND JUSTICE, ET. AL., PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAM ASSESSMENT, supra note 17 at
250.
269. Id. at 252. Generally, decoding facial expression requires analyzing many different
factors associated with the face, taking master decoders several hours to interpret. Id. See also
Patti Davis, Smile ... Or Else:'Behavior Detection Officers' Are Now Watching Passengers'
Facial Expressions for Signs of Danger, NEWSWEEK, 2007 (reprinted at
http://www.911blogger.com/node/10721) (last visited January 2, 2010); and Dr. John M.
Grohol, Behavior Detection Officers at U.S. Airports, World of Psychology,
http://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2007/08/18/behavior-detection-officers-at-us-airports/
(last visited January 2, 2010).
270. Meaning paralinguistic information carried by a voice's pitch, timbre, and tempo.
COMMITTEE OF LAW AND JUSTICE, ET. AL., PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST TERRORISM: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAM ASSESSMENT, supra note 17 at 254.
271. See J. E. Schmidt, M.D., ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE (Matthew Bender
2008). Circulation and perspiration is controlled by the autonomic nervous system ("ANS").
These functions are "independent of the will" (unlike acts dependent upon will such as
walking, chewing, etc. which are governed by the central nervous system). Id.
272. COMMITEE OF LAW AND JUSTICE, ET. AL., PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE




emotions by "faking" a smile or inflecting their voice.273 Thus then,
perhaps the most important objective of any security program,
including SPOT, is the ability to limit these potentially devastating
errors: "[i]n addition to the highly desirable true positives and true
negatives that are produced, there will be the troublesome false
positives (an innocent person is thought to be guilty) and false
negatives (a guilty person is thought to be innocent)."2  As with all
law enforcement, mistakes will occur. In any circumstance, these
errors are unpalatable and cause great concern with everyone involved
in the legal process. However with airport security, such errors can be
catastrophic.
Although an obvious comment, it must be noted that SPOT
will only work if the person intent on committing the crime is anxious
about committing it. 7 One need only dissect the Dec. 25, 2009
bombing attempt over Detroit to verify this SPOT restriction. 276 All
reports of the incident noted how calm the bomber went about his
work.277 Even after being tackled by other passengers, the bomber
simply stated he had an explosive device and became extremely
cooperative with authorities. 78 He appeared to be a "normal"
passenger flying to the U.S. Instead, he was a suicide bomber with ties
to terrorist organizations in Yemen.279
To determine the success of the SPOT program as
implemented today, one need only look at its brief history. The SPOT
program started in Boston at the Logan International Airport in
2003.280 By 2008, the program was in place at more than 150
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Transportation Security Administration, The Truth Behind the Title: Behavior
Detection Officer, THE TSA BLOG, Feb. 29, 2008 available at
http://blog.tsa.gov/2008/02/truth-behind-title-behavior-detection.html (last visited Sept. 1,
2010) (noting that behavior analysis is "based on the fear of being discovered").
276. See supra, note 6.
277. James Gordon Meek and Rich Schapiro, Alleged Nigeria Terrorist Umar Farouk
Abdulmutall [sic] Tries to Explode Northwest Airlines 253 to Detroit, NY DAILY NEWS, Dec.
26, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2009/12/25/2009-12-
25_passenger sets off firecrackersaboard detroit bound delta plane.html).
278. Id. See also Associated Press, US. Files Charges in Jet-Terror Incident, USA
TODAY, Dec. 26, 2009 http://www.usatoday.contravel/flights/2009-12-25-airliner-
disturbance-detroitN.htm.
279. Brian Ross and Richard Esposito, Abdulmutallab: More Like Me in Yemen, ABC
NEWS, Dec. 28, 2009 http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/abdulmutallab-yemen-northwest-flight-
253-terror-suspect/story?id=9430536.
280. Transportation Security Administration, BDOs SPOT More Than Just Opportunities
at TSA, supra note 13.
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airports. 281 During this year alone, 98,905 passengers nationwide were
subjected to secondary screenings as requested by BDOs.282 Of those
passengers, police actually questioned only 9,854.283 Of those
passengers, only 813 were arrested.284 Since 2006, SPOT has led to the
secondary screenings of more than 160,000 passengers.285 Less than
one percent of these passengers, 1,266 passengers to be exact, were
arrested.286 These arrests consisted mainly of drug crimes, possessing
fraudulent documents, and having outstanding warrants.287 The TSA,
however, continues to praise the successes of the program; yet, none of
the arrests reported have been terrorist related.288
Critics soon denounced the program, arguing that the program
is flawed. 289 The United States General Accounting Office ("GAO"),
very critical of the job the TSA has done in implementing the DHS's
National Infrastructure Protection Plan ("NIPP"), analyzed the risk
assessment the TSA performed in creating its strategic passenger
screening plan. As part of that analysis, the GAO confirmed that
"these efforts [do not] meet the risk-based framework outlined in the
NIPP."290 Thus, the TSA continues to invest in security technologies
that may not work.29 1 In support of this analysis, statistics show that
281. Frank, supra note 17.
282. Kaye, supra note 15.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Frank, supra note 17 (taken from a graph TSA provided to USA Today).
286. Id.
287. Id. An interesting question also arises with these arrests: Were they fruits of illegal
searches? If these suspects were discovered via searches beyond the scope permitted by Terry,
they quite possibly could have a Fourth Amendment claim.
288. See Transportation Security Administration, Tampa BDO Team 'SPOTs' Man
Alleged to Have Illegal Drugs, April, 2009
(http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/tampa bdoillegal-drugs.shtm) (passenger charged
with twenty-two counts of illegal possession of prescription drugs after being spotted by BDO
team); and Transportation Security Administration, SPOT Proves Its Value at BWI, Aug. 2,
2007 (http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/bwistory.shtm) (BDO at Baltimore/Washington
International Airport referred suspicious man to authorities who found a loaded gun and
ammunition).
289. Frank, supra note 17. See also UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
REPORT, GAO-10-128 supra note 6 (noting that the TSA had not incorporated "key risk
management principles" as required by the DHS).
290. UNITED STATEs GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, GAO-10-128 supra note 6.
291. See id. "[The] TSA has continued to invest in checkpoint technologies without the
benefit of the risk assessment information outlined in the NIPP. Consequently, TSA increases
the possibility that its investments will not address the highest priority security needs." Id.
SPOT itself cost nearly $200 million in 2009. Armen Keteyian, TSA 's Program to Spot




SPOT does not catch the criminal it is designed to catch. "Behavioral
profiling has never turned up someone planning harm to aviation
security. It has never turned up a person with weapons, guns, bombs,
or any other implement that would cause a flight to be delayed, much
less brought down." 292 Put bluntly, the program has a 100% failure
rate: it has never stopped a terrorist. 293 Since 2004, sixteen individuals
later accused of terrorist involvement flew twenty-three times within
the United States and were never caught by the BDOs working in
those airports. 2 94 Stephen Fienberg, a Carnegie Mellon scientist who
studied the TSA program stated, "I think it's a sham. We have no
evidence it works." 295
However, one could argue that SPOT, with all of its untapped
potential, is no less flawed than most of the security features used by
296the TSA today. More technology becomes the country's "battle cry"
with every attempted terrorist attack. As a result increasingly
sophisticated metal detectors and explosive detection devices are being
designed and ordered for the largest airports around the country. The
newest and most highly publicized of these machines is a full-body
scanner which can literally see under clothes to find weapons or
297
explosives taped to a person's body. But, unfortunately, this type of
security cannot detect "powders, liquids, thin pieces of plastic or
anything that resembles skin." 298 It also cannot detect anything
"concealed internally." 299 Proponents of SPOT can then argue that
machines simply do not work all the time. In that case, it may indeed
by up to a human assessment to prevent potential disaster.
292. Jim Harper, Not Just a Program with Problems, a Program with Constitutional
Problems, CATO@LIBERTY, Nov. 21, 2008 http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2008/11/2 1/not-just-
a-program-with-problems-a-program-with-constitutional-problems/ (last visited 10.27.2009).
293. Keteyian, supra note 291.
294. Id.
295. Frank, supra note 17.
296. Sammy Elrom, TSA and Aviation Security: What is Wrong with Their Concepts and
Strategy, GLOBAL POLITICIAN, Oct. 12, 2007.
297. See generally JetSetCD, Full-Body Scanners 101: The Two Types and How They
Work, JAUNTED, Jan. 5, 2010 http://www.jaunted.com/story/2010/1/5/163631/3181/travel/Full-
Body+Scanners+101%3A+The+Two+Types+and+How+They+Work.
298. Cynthia Boll, Can Airport Body Scanners Stop Terrorist Attacks?, Time.com, Jan. 5,
2010 available at http://www.time.com/time/worldlarticle/0,8599,1951529,00.html (last
visited Aug. 31, 2010).
299. Id.
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V. SPOT: SUBJECTIVE PROFILING UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Publically, the TSA is quick to stress that SPOT is "race-
neutral" profiling:300  "[r]eferrals are based on specific observed
behaviors only, not on one's appearance, race, ethnicity or religion."301
As quoted in the Washington Post, TSA spokeswoman San Koshetz
stated, "[w]e're not looking for a type of person, but at behaviors."302
Conveniently, the TSA will not reveal all the suspicious behaviors that
will catch the eye of well-trained BDOs. Opting instead for the generic
labels of "anxiety" or "nervousness," the TSA argues that discussing
the "other behaviors" in detail will compromise the integrity of the
program.303 The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), however,
does not believe that explanation. Tim Sparapani, senior legal counsel
with the ACLU in Washington, stated, "[t]he other unidentified criteria
are unjustified ways to profile," adding that the program "is a fictional
bit of defense against terror." 304
Privately, the ultimate decision on who to stop for additional
questioning rests with the individual agents.305 Although they may be
trained to ignore race or ethnicity when observing the passengers,
separating oneself from making internal subjective judgments can be
extremely difficult if not impossible. 306 In fact, it is quite reasonable to
believe that many BDOs are making racially based decisions
300. Donnell, Sally B., A New Tack for Airport Screening: Behave Yourself, Time.com,
May 17, 2006.
301. Transportation Security Administration, Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) Layers
of Security, http://www.tsa.gov/what-wedo/layers/bdo/index.shtm (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
302. Kaye, supra note 15.
303. Behavior Detection Program Hitting Stride with TSA, SecuritySolutions.com, Jan. 8,
2008 http://securitysolutions.com/news/tsa-behavior-detection/.
304. Bill Meyer, TSA Sweats the Small Stuff to Spot Subtle Terror Signs, Cleveland.com,
Aug. 31, 2008
(http://www.cleveland.com/nationlindex.ssf/2008/08/tsa-sweats-smallstuff to_spot.html).
305. See Transportation Security Administration, Job Title: Expert TSO - Behavior
Detection Officer (BDO), USAJobs, available at
http://www.usajobs.org/jobs/68848213/Expert%20TSO%20-
%20Behavior0/o20Detection%200fficer/o20(BDO).htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). In the
Administration's job listing, they list as a job requirement the ability to "independently
complete the majority of work without need to refer issues to a superior for decision." Id.
306. Nasir Naqvi, et. al, The Role of Emotion in Decision Making, 15 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 260 (2006) (noting that decision-making is "aided by
emotions, in the form of bodily states, that are elicited during the deliberations of future
consequences..."). See also David Brooks, The Empathy Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009 at
25. "In reality, decisions are made by imperfect minds in ambiguous circumstances." Id.
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unconsciously. 307 Going into the job with the prior knowledge that all
nineteen hijackers who peretrated the worst act of terrorism on U.S.
soil were Middle Eastern must certainly color every decision an
agent makes. 309 Furthermore, in knowing this truth, should an agent
exercising limited profiling (whether consciously or unconsciously)
when supported by other reasonable objective suspicions be
condemned? "Effective and tight security is about preventing a
perpetrator at all cost, all the time, from bypassing or fooling the
system. This critical objective is not achievable if a political, religion
or ethnic 'passenger correctness' is in place." 310
Of course, blatant racial bias cannot be tolerated. Indeed, in
Adarand Constructors v. Pena,311 the Supreme Court ruled that
racially motivated classifications must come under strict scrutiny;3 12
these classifications are constitutional "only if they are narrowl
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests."3
"When [political judgments] touch upon an individual's race or ethnic
background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden
he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a
307. Id. "The mind tries on different solutions to see if they fit. Ideas and insights bubble
up from some hidden layer of institutions and heuristics.... The emotions serve as guidance
signals.. .as you feel your way toward a solution." Id.
308. 9/11 REPORT 160, 162-163, 225, 231, 435-436. Nineteen total hijackers carried out
the plot on 9/11. American Airlines Flight 11: Mohamed Atta ("pilot hijacker") from Egypt,
and Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri, Satam al Suqami, and Abdul Aziz al Omari ("muscle
hijackers") from Saudi Arabia. United Airlines Flight 175: Marwan al Shehhi ("pilot
hijacker") from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Ahmed al Ghamdi, Hamza al Ghamdi, and
Mohand al Shehri ("muscle hijackers") from Saudi Arabia, and Fayez Banihammad ("muscle
hijacker") from the UAE. American Airlines Flight 77: Hani Hanjour ("pilot hijacker") from
Saudi Arabia, and Nawaf al Hazmi, Khalid al Mihdhar, Majed Moqed, and Salem al Hazmi
("muscle hijackers") from Saudi Arabia. United Airlines Flight 93: Ziad Jarrah ("pilot
hijacker") from Lebanon, and Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmad al Haznawi, and Ahmed al Nami
("muscle hijackers") from Saudi Arabia. Id. Thirteen of the muscle hijackers were between the
ages of 20-28. Id. at 231.
309. See generally Brooks, supra note 306.
310. Elrom, supra note 296.
311. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
312. Id. at 224 (establishing three propositions that when taken together mandate that any
governmental racial classification be subject to the "strictest judicial scrutiny": (1) skepticism-
"any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching
examination"; (2) consistency-"the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is
not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification"; (3)
congruence-"equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under
the Fourteenth Amendment") (citations omitted).
313. Id. at 227.
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compelling governmental interest. The Constitution guarantees that
right to every person regardless of his background."3 14
Thus, under Adarand, racial or ethnic rofiling is constitutional
if the government's interest is compelling. As discussed above in
Sokolow and Whren, the constitutionality of the governmental action is
dependent on the circumstances surrounding it: "[c]ontext matters
when reviewing race-based governmental action. Not every decision
influenced by race is equally objectionable and strict scrutiny is
designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the
importance and the sincerity of the government's reasons for using
race in a particular context." 3 16 Knowing that racial profiling is
tolerated when governmental interest-taken in context-is compelling,
one must then ask the question, "What is more compelling than
preventing a repeat of 9/1 1?"
According to the Department of Justice Backgrounder on
Outreach and Enforcement Efforts to Protect American Muslims,
nearly seven million American Muslims live in the United States. 3 17
Yet considering only a fraction of that number may at any time be
flying within the United States (as well as the non-American Muslims
flying into the United States), the percentage of those who have been
confirmed or accused terrorists is extremely small. As the Farag court
noted, "[e]ven granting that all of the participants in the 9/11 attacks
were Arabs, and even assuming arguendo that a large proportion of
would-be anti-American terrorists are Arabs, the likelihood that any
given airline passenger of Arab ethnicity is a terrorist is so negligible
that Arab ethnicity has no probative value in a particularized
reasonable-suspicion or probable-cause determination." 3 1
Profiling also has the real potential of "fueling the terrorists'
fire." Rhetoric such as the quote from Retired Lieutenant General
Thomas McInerney, who proclaimed on Fox News, "If you are an 18
314. Id. at 244-55 (quoting Justice Powell in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978).
315. See also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 at 908 (1996) ("we have recognized that, under
certain circumstances, drawing racial distinctions is permissible where a governmental body is
pursuing a 'compelling state interest').
316. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327(2003).
317. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BACKGROUNDER ON OUTREACH
AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS TO PROTECT AMERICAN MUSLIMS (June, 2009)
(http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/muslim-protect-effort.pdf). Considering the
population of the United States - 307,006,550 as of July 1, 2009 as reported by the U.S.
Census Bureau (available at http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html) -
Muslims, at seven million, is not a high percentage of the population (approximately two
percent)).
318. Farag, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
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to 28-year-old Muslim man, then you should be strip searched,"319
only strengthens al-Qaeda's message that the United States is at war
with Islam and all Muslims. 32 0 But should airport security really
subject an eighty-year-old white woman from rural Kentucky to the
same scrutiny as a twenty-year-old Middle Eastern man who also
seems a bit nervous about getting on the plane? "A racial-profiling
ban, under which police officers [or TSA agents] were required to stop
and question suspects in precise proportion to their demographic
representation ... would lead to massive inefficiencies in police
work." 3 2 1 Proportionally, police officers generally stop more young
people than old people since more oung people generally commit
more violent crimes than old people. 2 Proportionally, police officers
generally stop more African-Americans than whites since more
African-Americans commit more violent crime than whites. 323 if
however, police officials were to ever admit that profiling plays any
role in their officers' decisions on whom to stop, they would be
immediately targeted as racists. With all the evidence that the world
now possesses on who desires to commit more terroristic crime than
others, perhaps such "knee-jerk" reactions have lost their viability:
The campaign to ban racial profiling is, as I see it, a
part of that large, broad-fronted assault on common
sense that our over-educated, over-lawyered society has
been enduring for some forty years now, and whose
319. FOX News Guest: 'Strip Search All 18-28-Year-Old Muslim Men at Airports', THE
HUFFINGTON PosT, Jan. 3, 2010 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/03/fox-news-guest-
strip-sear n_409545.html
320. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The
Foundation of the New Terrorism, Aug. 21, 2004 available at http://www.9-
11 commission.gov/report/91 IReport Ch2.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
321. John Derbyshire, In Defense of Racial Profiling: Where is Our Common Sense?,
NATIONAL REVIEW, Feb. 19, 2001 (available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/19febOl/derbyshireO2l90l.shtml). "Which is to say, massive
declines in the apprehension of criminals." Id.
322. The average age for arrestees in the United States for violent crimes between the
years 1993-2001 was 29 years old. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, AGE-SPECIFIC ARREST RATES AND RACE-SPECIFIC ARREST RATES FOR
SELECTED OFFENSES, 1993-2001, Nov. 2003 (available at
http://www.fbi.gov/filelink.html?file=/ucr/adducr/age racespecific.pdf).
323. African-Americans committed over fifty percent of all the murders and non-
negligent manslaughters committed in 2008. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES
DIVIsIoN, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2008 CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES TABLE 43:
ARREST BY RACE, 2008 (http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table 43.html). However, black
persons make up only 12.8 percent of the U.S. population. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE &
COUNTY QUICK FACTS, USA, Nov. 17, 2009
(http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfdlstates/00000.html).
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roots are in a fanatical egalitarianism, a grim
determination not to face up to the realities of group
differences, a theological attachment to the doctrine that
the sole and sufficient explanation for all such
differences is "racism."324
Courts continue to struggle with the concept of racial profiling
at airports since 9/11. The law clearly states the race cannot be the
only factor when detaining someone at an airport, even if the
conversation is consensual and any "other reasons" articulated by the
officers that may justify the stop must be more than "an 'inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch.'" 325  "Although the Fourth
Amendment does not single out race as a matter of special concern, it
does impose a general requirement that any factor considered in a
decision to detain must contribute to 'a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity."'326 For example, race may be used as an "identifying factor"
in the description of a suspect.327 If the ethnicity of a perpetrator is
known, such as from the statement of a victim or witness, the ethnicity
limits the investigation and police may consider this factor when
questioning suspects. 328 With today's ever-increasing terroristic threat,
diligent governments cannot turn a blind eye to the known seed of
most of the world's terror cells: the radical Islamic group al-Qaeda
based primarily in the Middle East. Indeed, with Osama bin Laden
continuing to issue terror threats against the United States and its
allies, ignoring such an obvious fact would be not only irresponsible,
but should another attack such as 9/11 occur, nearly unforgiveable. 329
If this is true, then why are so many people skittish about
admitting that profiling is a "necessary evil"? Perhaps it is not so much
the country's current situation as it is a remembrance of a controversial
past. Racial or ethnic profiling immediately brings back memories of
the Japanese interments during World War II. Affirmed at the time by
324. Derbyshire, supra note 321.
325. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
326. Faraq, 587 U.S. at 462 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18
(1981)).
327. Id.
328. Id. See also Tom Head, Levy: Can Ethnic Profiling be Constitutional, About.com:
Civil Liberties (Aug. 17, 2006) (http://civilliberty.about.com/b/2006/08/17/levy-can-ethnic-
profiling-be-constitutional.htm).
329. United Press international, Bin Laden Message, DAILY BRIEFING, Jan. 25, 2010
available at http://www.upi.com/Daily-Briefing/2010/01/25/Bin-Laden-message/UPI-
97361264427618/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2010) (noting that this most recent message directed to
President Obama from bin Laden warns of upcoming terror attacks).
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the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States,330  ethnic
discrimination against Japanese Americans was overtly promulgated
by Acts of Congress, Executive Orders and Military Command.33
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice,
without reference to the real military dangers which
were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu
was not excluded from the Military Area because of
hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because
we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the
properly constituted military authorities feared an
invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take
proper security measures, because they decided that the
military urgency of the situation demanded that all
citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the
West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress,
reposing its confidence in this time of war in our
military leaders-as inevitably it must-determined that
they should have the power to do just this. There was
evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military
authorities considered that the need for action was
great, and time was short. We cannot-by availing
ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight-now say
that at that time these actions were unjustified.332
While superseded by statute,333 the ruling in Korematsu still
stands, 334 not for the proposition that the Japanese (or any ethnic
330. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Korematsu remained in San Leandro, CA, within the
mandatory evacuation area described in Order No. 34 and was arrested).
331. The Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 at issue in Korematsu directed that "all persons
of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated from [a portion of Alameda
County, CA] by 12 o'clock noon, P.W.T., Saturday, May 9, 1942." J. L. Dewitt, Lieutenant
General, U.S. Army Commanding, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army Wartime
Civil Control Administration, EXCLUSION ORDER No. 34, May 3, 1942
(http://www.hsp.org/default.aspx?id=1131) (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
NOTE: The exact description of the evacuation area can be found within the order itself.
332. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24.
333. See Pub. L. 100-383, §2(a), 102 Stat. 903 (as quoted in Adarand Constructors, 515
U.S. at 215, "The Congress recognizes that...a grave injustice was done to both citizens and
permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and interment of
civilians during World War II"). Codified at 50 USCS Appx § 1989 et. seq.
334. For a Japanese perspective on the internment experience, see 8 Natsu Taylor Saito,
Symbolism Under Seige: Japanese American Redress and the "Racing" ofArab Americans as
"Terrorists", ASIAN L. J. I (May, 2001) (also noting that Korematsu has not been overturned
and remains, for better or worse, the law of the land).
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group) should be constrained to internment camps or subject to
curfew, but for the ideal that any classification based on race must
withstand rigorous judicial analysis weighing the burden on the racial
group compared to the governmental interest driving the classification.
Are Arab-Americans and Muslims really being "raced as terrorists:
foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening?"3 35 Interestingly, a
cover on The New Yorker published in 1993 showed several
"American" children building a replica of New York City on the beach
with an "Arab" dressed child trying to destroy the World Trade
Center.336 Today, as harsh as it may sound, the cover seems to be an
ominous warning of the anti-American sentiment growing among the
most radical members of Islam. As recognized in the 9/11 Report, the
enemy today is not some "generic evil."337 The enemy threat is
Isalmist terrorism, "especially the al Qaeda network."338
The TSA acknowledges that SPOT is based largely on the
successes of a similar program utilized by the Israeli's at their Ben-
Gurion International Airport in Tel Aviv. Israeli airport security also
monitors suspicious behavior, often engaging passengers in lengthy
conversations before they even enter the terminal.339 In fact,
passengers must receive a pass from these profilers before they are
allowed to check in for their flight.340 But unlike Israel, the United
States bans ethnic, racial, or religious profiling. "The Israeli airline El
Al has a policy of singling out young Arabs for extensive search
procedures, but is quick to point out that, in spite of ongoing war in the
Middle East, it has not had a hijacking in over thirty years.
While many civil rights groups have called for an end to the
profiling, Israel maintains that "profiling. . is essential to focus on a
very small percentage of passengers with terrorist intent."342 "No
335. Hack, supra note 250.
336. David Mazzucchelli, Castles in the Sand, THE NEW YORKER, July 26, 1993, at cover
(can be seen at http://archives.newyorker.com/?i=1993-07-26) (last visited Jan. 5. 2010).
337. 9/11 REPORT 362.
338. 9/11 REPORT 362. Clearly, Islam does not teach such extreme violence. As President
Bush stated after the 9/11 attacks, "Islam is a faith that brings comfort to a billion people
around the world. It's a faith that has made brothers and sisters of every race. It's a faith based
upon love, not hate." 9/11 REPORT 54. Indeed, "Bin Ladin's followers are commonly
nicknamed takfiri, or 'those who define other Muslims as unbelievers,' because of their
readiness to demonize and murder those with whom they disagree." 9/11 REPORT 54.
339. Jeff Jacoby, What Israeli Security Could Teach Us, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 23,
2006.
340. Id.
341. Siggins, supra note 43.
342. Harvey Simon, US. Urged to Look at Israel as Model for Airline Security, I
Aviation Week's Homeland Security & Defense 7, Feb. 6, 2002.
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sensible person imagines that ethnic or religious profiling alone can
stop every terrorist plot. But it is illogical and potentially suicidal not
to take account of the fact that so far every suicide-terrorist plotting to
take down an American plane has been a radical Muslim man."343
Ariel Merari, an Israeli terrorism expert, calls such political
correctness foolish: "[i]t's foolishness not to use profiles when you
know that most terrorists come from certain ethnic groups and certain
age groups. A bomber on a plane is likely to be Muslim and young.
We're talking about preventing a lot of casualties, and that justifies
inconveniencing a certain ethnic group." 344 As stated by Rafi Sela, a
security consultant with Ben-Gurion International Airport, "[y]es, the
Arabs are going through a much tighter investigation-interrogation
because of threat they pose than an Israeli who served in the army who
is going on vacation. How many blond, blue-eyed ladies have brought
down planes in the last 20 years? They were all fanatic Muslims. So, if
you are a Muslim, we have to find out if you are a fanatic or not." 345
Ideally, airport security agents should have all options open to
them in order to make the best decision possible under the
circumstances. As long as the agents can identify other factors which
appear suspicious, race as a factor must be allowed: "most Muslims
are not violent jihadis, but all violent jihadis are Muslim. How much
longer will we tolerate an aviation security system that pretends, for
reasons of political correctness, not to know that?" 346 Even Khalid
Mahmood, a British Member of Parliament and a Muslim, believes
racial profiling is necessary in today's society: "I think most people
would rather be profiled than blown up. It wouldn't be victimisation
[sic] of an entire community. I think people will understand that it's
only through something like profiling that there will be some kind of
safety." 347
343. Jacoby, supra note 339.
344. Associated Press, Rights Group Challenges Israel's Airport Security, March 19,
2008 (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23714853/).
345. Glen McGregor, Looking Passengers in Eye Best Airport Security, Israeli Expert
Says, Canwest News Service, Jan. 3, 2010
(http://www.canada.com/news/world/Looking+passengers+best+airport+security/2401529/sto
ry.html).
346. Jacoby, supra note 339.
347. CNN-IBN, Muslim AP in UK says racial profiling need of the day, IBNLive, World
section, Jan. 6, 2010 (http://ibnlive.in.com/news/muslim-mp-in-uk-says-racial-profiling-need-
of-the-day/108271-2.html).
2010] 335
336 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 10:2
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to 9/11,348 the major threat to aviation security appeared
to be the placing of bombs on planes, not the planes becoming
bombs.349 As late as 1999, the FAA Civil Aviation Security
Intelligence Office assessed a suicide hijacking as "an option of last
resort."350 After 9/11, however, what was once thought inconceivable
became all too real. After 9/11, racial profiling became not merely a
"good idea," but an argued requirement for national security:
More than 6,000 people are dead, some would argue,
because of insufficient attention to racial or ethnic
profiles at our airports.... Let's be blunt: How can law
enforcement not consider ethnicity in investigating
these crimes when that identifier is an essential
characteristic of the hijackers and their supposed
confederates and sponsors, and when law
enforcement's ignorance of the community heightens
the importance of such broadly shared characteristics?
Law enforcement tactics must be calibrated to address
the magnitude of the threat society faces.35 1
Mohamed Atta, one of the 9/11 terrorists who boarded
American Airlines Flight 11 bound for Los Angeles, was actually
selected by CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening
System)352 in Portland for additional security measures. All "additional
348. As of September 11, 2001, air space safety for the United States was controlled by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD). While the FAA was concerned with only "internal" airspace and
NORAD was generally concerned with only "external" threats, the two agencies had
developed protocols to work together in the event of a hijacking. 9/11 REPORT 4, 17.
349. VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, CHAIRMAN, WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON AVIATION
SAFETY AND SECURITY, FINAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT CLINTON, supra note 252 (most of the
recommendations to aviation security concern bomb or explosive detection. The report also
notes with significant concern a potential for surface to air missiles being used to bring down
commercial aircraft. The one significant recommendation which considers the actual
passengers boarding the aircraft (rather than their baggage) is one which mandates stricter
passenger profiling. See id. at Recommendation 3.19).
350. 9/11 REPORT 345. It should be noted, however, the some governmental agencies did
propose the idea of hijacked aircraft crashing into American buildings. However, the threat
was thought to be from flights overseas, not from within the United States. See id at 346.
351. Alschuler, supra note 159 at 164 (quoting John Farmer, Jr., the Attorney General of
New Jersey, in Rethinking Racial Profiling, Newark Star-Ledger §10, p. 1 Sept. 23, 2001).
352. CAPPS is a computerized algorithm that identifies passengers for secondary
screening "based on certain travel behaviors reflected in their reservation information that are
associated with threats to aviation security, as well as through a random selection of
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security measures" meant was "that his checked bags were held off the
plane until it was confirmed that he had boarded the aircraft."3 5 3
"Primarily because of concern regarding potential discrimination," 354
the FAA did not submit passengers selected by CAPPS to any other
additional screening. 3 55 Atta was cleared and went onto Boston
unimpeded. Three of his assistant hijackers were also selected by
CAPPS in Boston, each with the same result: their baggage was held
but no additional checkpoint screening was performed. Having passed
easily through the metal detector, the four hijackers boarded the
plane.356
Meanwhile in Washington, D.C., Hani Hanjour, Khalid al
Mihdhar and Majed Moqed, three of the five hijackers on board
American Airlines Flight 77 bound for Los Angeles, were also flagged
by CAPPS. The other two hijackers, Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al
Hazmi, were flagged by a customer service representative who found
the passengers to be "suspicious." Again, the only true consequence
was that their baggage was held until they boarded the plane. At the
checkpoint, Mihdhar and Moqed both set off the metal detector alarm.
They were directed to a second detector. Mihdhar passed the second
test and was allowed into the sterile area. Moqed set off the second
detector and was hand-wanded. He passed and was allowed through.
Twenty minutes later, Hanjour passed through security without
incident. Salem al Hazmi also passed but his brother Nawaf failed both
the first and second metal detector. After being hand-wanded, he was
allowed to pass. When questioned later, none of the screeners could
recall anything out of the ordinary about these passengers.357
In Newark, hijacker Ahmad al Haznawi was also selected by
CAPPS. His checked bag was screened for explosives and he was
allowed on the plane. As in Boston, the screeners when interviewed
about the event could not recall anything unusual or suspicious. 358
"Until the hijackers stormed the cockpit door, they were just a handful
of Middle Eastern-looking men on their way to sunny California. So,
yes, let's be exceedingly clear about the whole matter. Some 3,000
passengers." UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, GAO-08-456T, supra
note 6.
352. 9/11 REPORT 84.
353. 9/11 REPORT 1. The checked baggage was screened for explosives or held off the
plane until the passenger boarded. Id. at 84.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 2.
357. Id. at 3.
358. Id. at 4.
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men, women and children are dead because the unassuming people on
those airplanes did not look at them and see murderers. Or dangerous
Arabs. Or fanatical Muslims. They saw a few guys in chinos." 359
If we were truthful with ourselves, we must all admit that we
"profile" to some extent. Whether we inadvertently cross the street to
avoid "a certain type of person" or drive ten minutes out of our way to
avoid "that part of town," we all make decisions in our daily lives on
who to socialize with and who to avoid.
On the scientific evidence, the primary function of
stereotypes is what researchers call "the reality
function." That is, stereotypes are useful tools for
dealing with the world. Confronted with a snake or a
fawn, our immediate behavior is determined by
generalized beliefs-stereotypes-about snakes and
fawns. Stereotypes are, in fact, merely one aspect of the
mind's ability to make generalizations, without which
science and mathematics, not to mention, as the
snake/fawn example shows, much of everyday life,
would be impossible.360
Arguably airport security has moved past mere stereotypes and
into verifiable fact. Treating passengers who are Middle Eastern in
appearance differently is using a constitutionally sound, objective
factor backed by irrefutable evidence. Ultimately, "[t]he mission of
responsible law enforcement officials in combating domestic terrorism
is to take what they know to be true about the ethnic identity of the
September 11th assailants, and combine it with other factors developed
through investigation and anal sis to focus investigative efforts and
avoid casting a net too wide." 36
Profiling does have the ability deter would-be terrorists.
According to an interview given on May 10, 2003 by Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, the alleged architect of the 9/11 attacks, the "review of
Muslims' immigration file ... forced al-Qaeda to operate less freely in
the United States."362 However, race can never be the only factor when
making the crucial decision to search and seize. Stopping every
Middle Eastern passenger without additional factors would not only
over-extend scarce security resources, but would also fail
359. Burlingame, supra note 196.
360. Derbyshire, supra note 321.
361. Siggins, supra note 43.
362. 9/11 REPORT 328.
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constitutional standards. Using race, however, as one factor when
determining whether to stop an individual exhibiting other suspicious
behaviors is not only legitimate law enforcement, but constitutionally
responsible. As the 9/11 Commission stated, "The choice between
security and liberty is a false choice, as nothing is more likely to
endanger America's liberties than the success of a terrorist attack at
home."363
Quite simply, "we must confront our national hysteria about
race, which causes large numbers of otherwise sane people to believe
that the hearts of their fellow citizens are filled with malice towards
them."364 Airport security, flight crews, and fellow passengers do not
harbor irrational ethnic hatred, flying millions of miles with people of
every race and religion. Yet, they do not, and cannot, lose their
common sense.
Today, when travelers and flight crews arrive at the
airport, all the overheated rhetoric of the civil rights
absolutists, all the empty claims of government career
bureaucrats, all the disingenuous promises of the
election-focused politicians just fall away. They have
families. They have responsibilities. To them, this is not
365
a game or a cause. This is real life.
SPOT can work. SPOT does work. One only need look at
Israel's success to see the phenomenal potential of the program.
However, it needs the freedom to work within our society as it truly
exists. By allowing limited profiling in conjunction with other
objective suspicious behaviors, America may hopefully find itself one
step closer to eliminating terror in its skies.
363. 9/11 REPORT 395.
364. Derbyshire, supra note 321.
365. Id.
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